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ABSTRACT 
  Antitrust law condemns price-fixing cartels and seeks to encourage 
private suits against the conspirators by automatically trebling 
antitrust damages and by providing for joint and several liability. 
Because the Supreme Court has held that there is no right to 
contribution among antitrust violators, this creates the risk of a single 
defendant being saddled with damages significantly greater than three 
times the amount of the harm associated with that firm’s own market 
share. 
  Firms engaged in—or accused of—price fixing often try to 
ameliorate this risk by entering into judgment-sharing agreements, 
which essentially create a right to contribution through contract. 
Despite their ubiquity, judgment-sharing agreements have received 
almost no scholarly attention. Courts and commentators uniformly 
praise them as a reasonable way for firms to manage risk and 
eliminate the perceived unfairness of joint and several liability without 
a right to contribution. 
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  This Article shows how judgment-sharing agreements can 
undermine antitrust deterrence and stabilize price-fixing cartels. Using 
both economic theory and empirical evidence, the Article explains 
how judgment-sharing agreements may reduce settlement values, lead 
to the suppression of incriminating evidence, reduce the likelihood of 
success of meritorious price-fixing suits, and make price fixing cost-
beneficial. The Article then argues that fairness arguments in favor of 
judgment-sharing agreements (and contribution more generally) are 
misguided and easily disproved, and in any event outweighed by the 
potential anticompetitive effects of such agreements. Finally, the 
Article advocates a more informed antitrust treatment of judgment-
sharing agreements that takes into account their potential use for 
anticompetitive purposes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Longevity breeds legitimacy. The longer that a particular form of 
conduct endures, the more reasonable and uncontroversial it seems. 
One example of this phenomenon in the context of antitrust litigation 
involves contracts among codefendants. Defendants in price-fixing 
suits often enter into judgment-sharing agreements, in which the firms 
agree by contract to allocate financial responsibility for any private 
liability among them. For example, if five firms of relatively equal size 
are alleged to have formed a price-fixing conspiracy, the defendants 
might agree to each pay 20 percent of the total damages (if any) 
either awarded to the plaintiff following trial or agreed to in 
settlement with the plaintiff—even if the plaintiff declines to sue all of 
the cartel’s members or some of the defendants are found not liable. 
At first glance, such judgment-sharing agreements (JSAs) seem 
harmless—a mechanism for defendants to spread risk. And JSAs are 
widespread, although their contents are generally confidential. 
Courts and commentators embrace JSAs because they are 
common and because the contracts appear so desirable at first glance. 
As their name indicates, judgment-sharing agreements involve 
sharing, a benevolent act that we are taught to value at an early age. 
By their terms, JSAs spread risk among firms at risk of liability for 
high damages. Such agreements seem economically similar to 
insurance pooling or maintaining a diversified stock portfolio—
uncontroversial conduct in any modern economy. Through sharing 
and risk spreading, judgment-sharing agreements reduce uncertainty 
and impose some measure of responsibility on every signatory to the 
agreement. 
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Despite their ubiquity, no scholarship addresses the potential 
negative aspects of judgment-sharing agreements. Unfortunately, 
beyond their benign rationales, JSAs may provide succor to price-
fixing conspiracies. This Article explains how JSAs, by distorting the 
settlement process in private antitrust litigation, can help both 
stabilize illegal cartels and create additional incentives for cartel firms 
to conceal price-fixing activities. As a result, JSAs undermine key 
goals of antitrust law: deterring, exposing, and punishing illegal price 
fixing. 
Part I of this Article explains the high stakes inherent in private 
antitrust litigation and notes the development of JSAs. Antitrust 
damages are automatically trebled. Both settlements and jury awards 
in antitrust cases often measure in the hundreds of millions of dollars 
and can exceed one billion dollars. Price-fixing defendants are jointly 
and severally liable for all damages caused by their conspiracy. But 
because antitrust doctrine does not include contribution rights, any 
single member of the conspiracy could be liable for three times the 
damages caused by all of the cartel participants. In an attempt to 
mitigate the harsh cumulative effects of these rules, antitrust 
defendants asked courts to recognize a right to contribution among 
price-fixing defendants. Those efforts having failed, many firms 
lobbied Congress to create a statutory right to contribution in 
antitrust law. With no statutory relief forthcoming, many price-fixing 
defendants sought to create contribution through contract by entering 
into judgment-sharing agreements. Courts, commentators, and 
members of Congress have generally assumed that JSAs are legal; 
none, however, has analyzed the potential anticompetitive effects of 
such agreements. 
Part II presents the arguments in support of JSAs. JSAs benefit 
the signatories—defendants in price-fixing cases—by facilitating 
business planning and allowing firms to spread risk. More 
importantly, JSAs prevent antitrust plaintiffs from leveraging the 
threat of enormous liability against individual firms to coerce 
settlements out of defendants afraid of being held responsible for the 
bulk of the damages caused by the entire price-fixing cartel. Most 
often, proponents of antitrust contribution assert that the absence of 
contribution disproportionately hurts smaller and even innocent 
defendants in price-fixing litigation. JSAs offer a way to ameliorate 
that harm. Furthermore, proponents of JSAs argue that the 
agreements enhance deterrence of cartels by increasing the likelihood 
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that every member of a price-fixing conspiracy will have to pay 
something to successful antitrust plaintiffs. 
Part III refutes the arguments presented in Part II and explains 
how JSAs may help create, stabilize, and conceal price-fixing 
conspiracies. First, the arguments in favor of JSAs are overstated. No 
empirical evidence shows that the no-contribution regime inflicts 
unfair pressure against innocent or small defendants. Antitrust law 
already provides many mechanisms that allow firms to manage the 
risks of legitimate agreements among competitors. Second, JSAs 
distort the settlement process in price-fixing litigation, reducing both 
the probability of reaching settlements and the value of negotiated 
settlements. Third, JSAs can help conceal a cartel by reducing cartel 
members’ incentive to collect and reveal evidence. Fourth, JSAs can 
stabilize a price-fixing cartel by solving the prisoners’ dilemma 
associated with illegal conspiracies in which each member of the 
conspiracy has an incentive to defect. Perhaps not surprisingly, those 
firms most likely to form cartels are the ones most likely to sign JSAs. 
Ultimately, JSAs undermine the deterrent effect of laws against price 
fixing. Part IV weighs the fairness and deterrence arguments both for 
and against JSAs and concludes that the deterrent effects prevail. 
Finally, Part V explores various antitrust approaches to JSAs. 
Part V explains why the confidentiality of JSAs creates problems for 
antitrust law and argues that JSAs should be discoverable. Because 
JSAs may undermine the prohibition against price fixing, antitrust 
scholars and judges must evaluate whether antitrust law should 
condemn JSAs and, if so, under what circumstances. A range of 
proposals is possible: make JSAs unenforceable, condemn JSAs as 
per se illegal, or evaluate JSAs under the rule of reason. Such analysis 
should consider the terms, timing, and signatories to the agreement. 
After evaluating these various approaches, Part V explores the role of 
JSAs in proving an underlying price-fixing agreement and advocates 
treating JSAs as a “plus factor” in antitrust analysis. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT-SHARING AGREEMENTS 
Price-fixing defendants created judgment-sharing agreements in 
response to an antitrust landscape that permitted significant 
disparities in the damages paid by defendants in the same cartel. 
Part I explains the antitrust damages regime and how defendants 
created JSAs to moderate the perceived harshness of this regime. 
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A. The High Stakes of Price-Fixing Litigation 
For firms found liable for conspiring to fix prices, antitrust law 
can pack quite a punch. First, total damages in price-fixing cases are 
often high for two reasons: damages are measured by the cartel’s 
overcharge, which can exceed one billion dollars,1 and the plaintiff’s 
actual damages are automatically trebled.2 Also, antitrust class actions 
can aggregate thousands of claims into a single lawsuit and the tolling 
of the statute of limitations due to fraudulent concealment means that 
the damages often go back much further than antitrust’s four-year 
statute of limitations might otherwise imply.3 
Second, antitrust law provides for joint and several liability.4 
Thus, each price-fixing firm is liable for the overcharges on its co-
conspirators’ sales.5 As its cartel partners earn illegal profits, each 
individual firm is legally responsible for triple the overcharge secured 
by its putative competitor. Any single price-fixing firm can be held 
accountable for the trebled value of the cartel’s total overcharges. 
Third, even when plaintiffs sue multiple cartel members, an early 
settlement with one firm can leave the remaining defendants on the 
hook for significant damages attributable to the settling defendant’s 
sales. Although the remaining defendants receive a credit for any 
settlement—to prevent the plaintiff from receiving a double 
recovery—the settlement amount is subtracted from defendants’ 
 
 1. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) ($3.4 billion settlement). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006). 
 3. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b; see also, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. MISC 99-
197(TFH), 2000 WL 1475705, at *2–3 (D.D.C. May 9, 2000) (explaining that the plaintiffs’ case 
survived a motion to dismiss in which fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations, 
extending the period for which recovery was available); In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 826 F. 
Supp. 1019, 1029 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (“[F]raudulent concealment tolls the Clayton Act’s statute 
of limitations.”). 
 4. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1968) (White, J., 
concurring) (“[D]amages normally may be had from either or both defendants without regard 
to their relative responsibility for originating the combination or their different roles in 
effectuating its ends.”); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 904 
n.15 (5th Cir. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 
(1981); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (“It is well settled that an 
antitrust action is a tort action and that in multi-defendant antitrust actions the co-conspirator 
joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of damages caused by their 
acts.” (citations omitted)). 
 5. E.g., Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (E.D. Va. 
1997). 
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damages only after the total damages are trebled.6 On the one hand, 
this policy encourages settlements because otherwise “each dollar 
received in settlement would cause a three-dollar reduction in the 
judgment at trial.”7 But because a settling defendant generally pays at 
most the single damages associated with its own sales, the remaining 
defendants risk being liable for the trebled-damage component of any 
overcharges on the settling defendant’s sales.8 
Fourth, while contribution would significantly minimize the 
effects of joint and several liability, antitrust law recognizes no right 
to contribution.9 Early cases consistently held that antitrust 
defendants had no right to contribution10 until the Eighth Circuit 
forged new ground in 1979 by permitting an antitrust defendant to 
sue its co-conspirators for contribution.11 The Supreme Court soon 
resolved the split in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,12 
holding that antitrust defendants did not possess a right to 
 
 6. Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 391 (4th Cir. 1982); Flintkote Co. v. 
Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir. 1957); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 11, 
CONTRIBUTION AND CLAIM REDUCTION IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION 5 (1986); see also Donald 
J. Polden & E. Thomas Sullivan, Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Litigation: A 
Legislative Analysis, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 402–03 (1983) (discussing Burlington 
Industries). 
 7. Yosef J. Riemer, Note, Sharing Agreements Among Defendants in Antitrust Cases, 52 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 304 (1984); see also Hydrolevel Corp. v. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, 
Inc., 635 F.2d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[D]eduction of settlement proceeds before trebling 
would discourage settlement by making litigation relatively more profitable for plaintiffs: every 
dollar received in settlement would cause a three dollar reduction in the judgment at trial.”), 
aff’d, 456 U.S. 989 (1982). 
 8. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 13, TREBLE-DAMAGES REMEDY 
15 (1986) (“Settling defendants rarely pay treble the overcharge resulting from their sales. 
Therefore, settlements have the potential of leaving the last co-conspirator in a suit liable for 
damages enormously greater than the overcharge caused by its sales pursuant to the 
conspiracy.”); Paula A. Hutchinson, Note, A Case Against Contribution in Antitrust, 58 TEX. L. 
REV. 961, 980 (1980) (“[T]he nonsettling defendants bear the risk that the plaintiff will settle 
with another defendant for less than the amount of damages directly attributable to it.”). 
 9. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2337–38 (2007) (“Contribution is 
defined as the ‘tortfeasor’s right to collect from others responsible for the same tort after the 
tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate share, the shares being determined as a 
percentage of fault.’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (8th ed. 1999))). 
 10. See, e.g., El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., No. C-75-2492 AJZ, 1976 WL 1382, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 
1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. C 75-104, 1977 WL 
1484, at *1 (D. Utah Oct. 25, 1977), aff’d, 649 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 11. Prof’l Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Nat’l Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 
1979), abrogated by Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
 12. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
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contribution and that only Congress could create such a right.13 
Absent any right to contribution, joint and several liability means that 
a prevailing antitrust plaintiff can collect all of its damage award from 
a single conspirator who cannot sue its co-conspirators to pay their 
“fair share.”14 And because neither a government nor a private 
plaintiff is required to sue every suspected member of an alleged 
price-fixing conspiracy,15 a single price-fixing conspirator could find 
itself alone in court with potentially staggering exposure.16 
Prior to and following the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas 
Industries, Congress considered a flurry of proposals to allow 
contribution in antitrust cases.17 Congress also debated legislation to 
eliminate joint and several liability for antitrust claims and to subtract 
settlement amounts before trebling.18 However, none of these 
proposals succeeded.19 Antitrust defendants thus took matters into 
their own hands. 
B. Judgment-Sharing Agreements 
With Congress declining to create a statutory right to 
contribution, many antitrust defendants have fashioned a contractual 
right to contribution by entering into judgment-sharing agreements.20 
 
 13. Id. at 646 (“[R]egardless of the merits of the conflicting arguments, this is a matter for 
Congress, not the courts, to resolve.”). 
 14. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
 15. E.g., Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963) (“A 
plaintiff need not sue all conspirators; he may choose to sue but one.”); Note, Contribution and 
Antitrust Policy, 78 MICH. L. REV. 890, 891 n.5 (1980) (“Similarly, the government need not sue 
all possible conspirators in a civil antitrust suit, and need not name all conspirators in a criminal 
antitrust indictment.” (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 129 n.2 (1966); 
United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass’n, 285 F.2d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 1961))). 
 16. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individual Treble 
Damage Responsibility: Which Path to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 
1284 (1987) (“For many firms, the risk of a catastrophic judgment is unacceptably high . . . .”). 
 17. See Polden & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 403–08. 
One possible alternative to full contribution is an option called “carve-out,” which 
“permits reduction before trebling of a plaintiff’s monetary claim against nonsettling defendants 
after one defendant has executed a settlement pact with plaintiffs.” Mark McCareins, Carve-Out 
as an Answer to the Contribution Question in Private Antitrust Litigation, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 975, 
1008–09 (1980) (advocating carve-out). 
 18. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1281. 
 19. See Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 394 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[J]oint and 
several liability . . . has been the established doctrine of antitrust law for the better part of a 
century . . . which Congress has not seen fit to disapprove.”) 
 20. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 19 (“A sharing agreement is, in 
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A JSA is a contract among antitrust defendants (and potential 
antitrust defendants) whereby the signatories agree in advance to 
their relative responsibility for any antitrust damages awarded at trial 
against any of them. In theory, these agreed-upon percentages reflect 
“each defendant’s relative role in the alleged conspiracy.”21 
Defendants often use market share as the basis for assigning damage 
responsibility in a JSA.22 In some cases, the JSA provides that the 
antitrust defendants will submit to arbitration to determine their 
percentage of any damages paid, either through settlement or at 
trial.23 
While once cutting edge, JSAs have become “fairly common” in 
antitrust litigation.24 When a price-fixing claim is filed against them, 
many firms reflexively attempt to negotiate a JSA among the named 
defendants.25 JSAs are particularly common when there are a small 
 
essence, contractual contribution.”); Mark Call Dickinson, Note, Contribution in Antitrust 
Treble Damage Actions, 6 J. CORP. L. 141, 163 (1980) (“The sharing agreement can be seen to 
be the equivalent of self-imposed rules of contribution . . . .”). 
 21. Dickinson, supra note 20, at 163. 
 22. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 13.23 (4th ed. 2004); Riemer, supra note 7, at 
295; see also, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 
997, 1995 WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (mem.) (discussing a JSA using a modified 
market share approach); S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 4 (1979) (“The liability is . . . based on an 
assessment of the damages attributable to each defendant’s specific relative benefit from the 
price-fixed sales weighted by the amount of the overcharge as reflected in its individual sales or 
purchases.”). 
 23. Lisa Bernstein & Daniel Klerman, An Economic Analysis of Mary Carter Settlement 
Agreements, 83 GEO. L.J. 2215, 2270 n.149 (1995). 
 24. Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Corporate Compliance Ethics and Malpractice Prevention, 1526 
PLI/CORP. 1387, 1401 (Jan.–Feb. 2006); Dickinson, supra note 20, at 163 (“[M]any defendants 
involved in private treble damage actions have joined forces and entered into judgment sharing 
agreements.”); Note, supra note 15, at 909 (“[S]haring agreements are fairly common among 
larger antitrust defendants in class action suits . . . .”). 
 25. Antitrust Damage Allocation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and 
Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 7 (1982) [hereinafter Antitrust 
Damage Allocation Hearings] (statement of A. Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (“At 
the beginning of any major antitrust litigation involving an alleged horizontal price fixing 
conspiracy among several defendants, defense counsel typically will meet with each other to 
determine if their clients are willing to enter into a so-called ‘sharing agreement.’”); id. at 25–26 
(statement of Stephen D. Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan) (arguing that “in every major 
antitrust conspiracy case, one of the first things the defendants do is get together and see if they 
can enter into a sharing agreement” but noting that negotiations often do not result in JSAs); 
Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979, S. 1468: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, 
Monopoly and Business Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 85 (1979) 
[hereinafter Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings] (statement of Robert P. Taylor) (noting 
that the attempt to achieve a JSA “is one of the first things” that price-fixing defendants do); S. 
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number of defendants because the relevant market is concentrated.26 
Defendants often face difficulty negotiating JSAs, however, as they 
debate what each defendant’s relative financial responsibility should 
be.27 In many cases, the parties can reach no accord, and they proceed 
into litigation as traditional codefendants, each firm out for itself.28 
Ultimately, no one knows the precise number of JSAs because 
defendants generally treat them as confidential contracts.29 
Despite their ubiquity, no scholarship addresses the many 
potential negative consequences—including anticompetitive effects—
of JSAs. Most observers simply assume that JSAs are valid and 
enforceable.30 When noting the possible use of JSAs to avoid the 
potential inequities of antitrust litigation during congressional 
 
REP. NO. 96-428, at 41 (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. Kennedy) (“Large 
defendants often attempt, to reach liability sharing agreements among all defendants who go to 
trial.”). 
 26. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 142 (statement of Robert 
P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro); S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 2. 
 27. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 121 (statement of 
Donald T. Hibner, Attorney) (“[Judgment-sharing] agreements are incredibly complex and 
difficult to negotiate. Where the defendants are few, of relatively the same size, and have 
relatively the same degree of innocence or guilt, such agreements are feasible. Where other 
factors are present, they are not.”). 
 28. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 142 (statement of Robert P. 
Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro) (“In a great many cases, however, because of 
disparities in size, culpability, market share or other such factors, defendants are not able to 
negotiate sharing agreements.”); id. at 232 n.14 (letter from Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, Pillsbury, 
Madison & Sutro, to members of the H. Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law) 
(“[P]rivate sharing agreements . . . frequently cannot be negotiated . . . .”). 
 29. Riemer, supra note 7, at 290 n.8 (“Because defendants often enter into sharing 
agreements on a confidential basis and then claim that the existence and terms of any such 
agreement are privileged as part of their joint defense, it is difficult to determine the extent to 
which sharing agreements are used.” (citations omitted)); see also A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, 
supra note 6, at 20 (“Unfortunately, there exists no helpful data measuring the frequency of use 
of sharing agreements.”); infra notes 266–71 (advocating that JSAs should be discoverable). 
 30. See, e.g., Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 7 (statement of A. 
Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody); id. at 135 (statement of Robert P. Taylor, Esq., 
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro); id. at 231 (letter from Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, Pillsbury, 
Madison & Sutro, to members of the H. Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law); id. at 
266 (statement of Hubert L. Will, J., United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois); id. at 444 (letter from Denis P. McInerney, Esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel, to Peter 
W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 448 (“Private sharing agreements 
are lawful . . . .”); id. at 474 (letter from James F. Rill, Esq., Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott, to 
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 479 (letter from Robert P. 
Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, to Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary) (“Many lawyers believe that judgment sharing agreements are lawful and 
enforceable . . . .”); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1326–27 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-359, at 2 (1982)). 
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debates in the 1980s regarding contribution among antitrust 
defendants, the head of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) 
Antitrust Division implicitly supported such sharing agreements.31 No 
witnesses during the proceedings considered the dangers of JSAs.32 
Indeed, some in Congress apparently believed that JSAs diminished 
the need for a statutory right to contribution among alleged price 
fixers.33 More recently, although noting that courts have the authority 
to decline to enforce JSAs that violate public policy, the Manual for 
Complex Litigation describes them as “generally appropriate.”34 Even 
when acknowledging their power to disallow JSAs, courts consistently 
uphold such arrangements as legal contracts.35 Judges have reasoned 
that although federal antitrust law does not recognize a right to 
contribution, the Court in Texas Industries did not prohibit 
defendants from acting on their own to effect contribution through 
contract.36 
II.  THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT-SHARING AGREEMENTS 
What little is written about JSAs enthusiastically supports these 
contracts. Just as contribution spreads risk,37 JSAs provide a 
mechanism for defendants in price-fixing cases to manage risk.38 The 
 
 31. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 467 (letter from William F. 
Baxter, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Peter W. Rodino, 
Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Of course, there is nothing in the Department’s 
proposal that would negate the possibility of defendants entering into sharing agreements after 
the passage of the proposed legislation; in fact, the legislation may well create strong incentives 
among defendants to enter into such agreements to avoid the potential and divisive costs of 
contribution litigation.”). 
 32. See S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 26 (1979). 
 33. Id. at 2 (“In many cases, defendants can arrange to enter into sharing agreements—
usually based on relative sales—to apportion the liability among themselves in a way that will 
avoid grossly disproportionate payments by any one defendant.”). 
 34. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.23. 
 35. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 61 (2d ed. 2002) 
(“Courts have upheld sharing agreements in antitrust cases against challenges to their validity.” 
(citations omitted)); see also Bernstein & Klerman, supra note 23, at 2270 n.149 (“Such 
agreements are generally upheld despite the fact that they will affect the defendants’ trial 
strategy and their incentives to testify in particular ways at trial.”). 
 36. Cimarron Pipeline Constr., Inc., v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Nos. CIV-89-822-T, 
CIV-89-1886-T, 1992 WL 350612, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 1992). 
 37. See Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 961. 
 38. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 19 (“Sharing agreements are attractive to 
defendants precisely because they manage the risk of a potentially large judgment and dampen 
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arguments advanced for JSAs fall into two categories: JSAs are good 
for the signatories, and JSAs are good for antitrust policy overall. 
A. Benefits for Signatories 
Commentators support JSAs as a mechanism to constrain the 
power of antitrust plaintiffs to unfairly exploit price-fixing 
defendants. Plaintiffs bringing antitrust lawsuits often need money to 
finance the litigation. Some plaintiffs are willing to accept relatively 
modest early settlements with one or more defendants in order to 
finance the litigation against the remaining defendants.39 Defendants 
in price-fixing cases also share an incentive to settle antitrust litigation 
early because they can often buy repose at a more affordable price. 
Once an antitrust plaintiff has secured litigation financing through an 
early settlement, it can engage in harder bargaining in settlement 
negotiations with the remaining alleged co-conspirators. This means 
that later-settling defendants often pay more than their codefendants 
who settled earlier.40 In some cases, antitrust plaintiffs actually 
announce that each subsequent settlement will take place at 
“progressively higher rates.”41 Some plaintiffs go further and bind 
themselves by including most-favored-nation clauses in their early 
settlement agreements, which assure the earlier-settling defendants 
that the later-settling defendants cannot receive more favorable 
settlement terms.42 
Much of an antitrust plaintiff’s leverage to demand higher 
payments from slow-moving defendants comes from the nonsettling 
 
the competition for early, cheap settlements.”). 
 39. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 37–38 (statement of Denis 
McInerney, Esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel). This is particularly true with antitrust class actions 
in which the class counsel has a vested interest in securing guaranteed money upfront, lest they 
be out their costs. 
 40. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 
997, 1995 WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (mem.) (“The plaintiffs ‘take small 
amounts . . . at the beginning of the settlement process’ and larger amounts as time progresses.” 
(quotation error in original) (quoting The Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act: Hearings Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 482 (1982))); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1288 n.67 
(providing settlement figures in corrugated container litigation). 
 41. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 15–16 (“In fact, the plaintiffs openly 
announced that each settlement in the case would be at progressively higher rates, and each 
settlement agreement contained a ‘most favored nation clause’ that assured that succeeding 
settlements would be no more favorable.” (footnote omitted)). 
 42. Id. 
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defendants’ ever-increasing exposure. Because of the features of the 
antitrust damages regime discussed in Part I, as each alleged co-
conspirator in a case settles, the remaining defendants are faced with 
a significantly greater amount of exposure. The lingering defendants 
remain liable for all of the damages suffered by an antitrust plaintiff, 
with the relatively small previous settlement subtracted only after 
trebling the total damages associated with the conspiracy.43 As the 
number of defendants dwindles, both the absolute and relative level 
of damages increases for the remaining defendants. This creates a so-
called whipsaw effect44 that imposes “great pressure on a defendant to 
settle early so as not to be exposed to the lion’s share of the joint 
trebled damages.”45 
Defense counsel and critics condemn this whipsaw effect as 
coercive and fundamentally unfair. The whipsaw effect is arguably 
coercive because with each settlement by one of the defendants, the 
remaining defendants face significantly greater exposure—they are 
potentially responsible for all of the damages—trebled—associated 
with the exiting defendants’ sales (minus the settlement). “The actual 
risk of a nonsettling defendant’s liability increases inversely to the 
number of nonsettling defendants because fewer defendants are left 
to share in the judgment.”46 Knowing this, plaintiff’s counsel can 
demand more money from later-settling defendants.47 Defendant 
firms that are more accustomed to settlement negotiations being an 
exercise in compromise—in which the parties’ settlement figures 
eventually converge—resent when plaintiffs increase their settlement 
demands after each successive settlement.48 Because firms worry 
about being the last defendant that could be responsible for the bulk 
of all the damages caused by the cartel, firms may be desperate to 
settle first or at least not be excluded from a universal settlement.49 In 
 
 43. Note, supra note 15, at 907. 
 44. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 15; Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1294. 
 45. WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 29 (1986). 
 46. McCareins, supra note 17, at 997. 
 47. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 37–38 (statement of Denis 
McInerney, Esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel). 
 48. See Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1289–90. 
 49. See Note, supra note 15, at 906 (discussing an example of a firm that acquiesced to 
global settlement). 
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some cases, codefendants seem to “stampede”50 to the plaintiff to 
avoid being the firm discussing settlement from the most vulnerable 
position.51 Some judges have asserted that when the majority of 
defendants have already settled with the antitrust plaintiff,52 the 
pressure on the remaining defendants to settle is “inherently 
coercive” because they cannot risk going to trial given the staggering 
potential damages.53 Even a defendant that was previously willing to 
go to trial may have a change of heart as its potential liability 
increases as its codefendants settle.54 
In addition to its coercive effect, some observers argue that the 
whipsaw phenomenon is also unfair because later-settling defendants 
pay more than their proportional share of the damages.55 Payment 
 
 50. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1294. 
 51. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 15 (“Thus, a competition develops 
among defendants to settle early in the case, when plaintiffs need money and settlements are 
cheap, which reduces the pool of remaining defendants and thereby further fuels the impetus to 
settle quickly.”); C. Douglas Floyd, Contribution Among Antitrust Violators: A Question of 
Legal Process, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 188; Jonathan M. Jacobson, Contribution Among 
Antitrust Defendants: A Necessary Solution to a Recurring Problem, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 217, 221 
(1980); Riemer, supra note 7, at 293–94 (discussing Corrugated Container and pointing out that 
“[t]he settlement pressures were said to be so great that twenty-three defendants paid an 
amount of almost $300 million during a one-month settlement ‘stampede’” (citing In re 
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff’d, 606 F.2d 319 (5th 
Cir. 1979))); Panic Aided Record Box Settlements, LEGAL TIMES (Wash., D.C.), May 7, 1979, at 
1. 
 52. The term “majority” here means that the settling defendants were responsible for the 
majority of the alleged cartel’s market share. 
 53. E.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. at 41. 
 54. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 15 (“Towards the end of this settlement 
process, proponents claim, the few remaining defendants face potential liabilities so large that 
they cannot afford to take the risk of going to trial and losing, even if justifiably convinced that 
they are innocent of any wrongdoing.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 134 (statement of 
Robert P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro) (“I strongly believe that any rational legal 
system must distribute liability on some basis among all those who are responsible for it. It is 
manifestly unfair to require one company arbitrarily to shoulder the entire burden of 
compensating a plaintiff, while other equally responsible and perhaps more culpable companies 
are required to pay nothing in compensation of the plaintiff.”); id. at 285 (statement of Hon. 
Barbara Jordan); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 13–14 (“Under the present law, 
it is possible for some violators to escape liability fully, by not being sued, or partially, by getting 
so-called ‘sweetheart settlements.’ Proponents of contribution legislation contend that this is 
also unfair.”); John Cirace, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Contribution and Claim Reduction in 
Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 42, 45 (1980) (“In general, whenever a 
defendant settles with the plaintiff for a sum less than three times the damages attributable to its 
acts, each remaining defendant faces an increased risk that it will be forced to bear more than its 
proportionate share of the damages.”); Jacobson, supra note 51, at 233 (“But is it fair to compel 
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size risks becoming a function of settlement order instead of relative 
culpability56 or market share.57 Some observers suggest that unfairly 
high payments for late-settling antitrust defendants are common.58 
The unfairness is magnified by the fact that the plaintiff can decide 
which alleged conspirator it would like in the vulnerable last position. 
The plaintiff can base its selection on any rationale, whim, or spite. 
The plaintiff may show leniency or grant a complete pass to one or 
more of the price-fixing firms—for example, because the plaintiff 
buys directly from them and wants to maintain good relations,59 
because the plaintiff is related to them,60 because the plaintiff is trying 
to simplify and speed up the litigation by suing the smallest 
conspirator capable of paying the total damages,61 or for no reason at 
 
Olson Farms to pay three times the damage caused by the entire conspiracy when it was 
responsible for only eleven percent? Clearly not.”). 
 56. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 
1995 WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (mem.) (“The relative culpability of the 
defendant is no longer pertinent. Instead, a sort of ‘game theory’ element emerges.”); 
Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1290 (“The lack of contribution in antitrust cases permits the 
utilization of whipsaw tactics that result in defendants paying settlement amounts bearing no 
reasonable relationship to their degree of culpability or their benefits from the conspiracy.”). 
 57. See Note, supra note 15, at 907 (“Defendants who settle early in the whipsaw usually 
pay far less than their share of the trebled liability—whether computed according to market 
shares or on some other basis—and non-settling defendants remain liable for the difference.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 58. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 38 (statement of Denis 
McInerney, Esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel) (“Consequently, it has become commonplace for 
late-settling defendants to be forced to contribute to settlements in amounts wholly 
disproportionate to their percentage of the questioned sales . . . .”). 
 59. See Prof’l Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Nat’l Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 
1979) (“This possibility [of escaping all liability] significantly increases where a large or 
powerful tortfeasor has sufficient economic influence to prevent a plaintiff from including it as a 
defendant.”), abrogated by Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); 
Note, supra note 15, at 905–06 (citing the trial record in Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, 
Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976)). 
 60. See Note, supra note 15, at 905 n.77 (“The plaintiff may be a blood relative of one of 
the potential defendants.” (citing Norfolk & S. R.R. v. Beskin, 125 S.E. 678 (Va. 1924))). 
 61. See Dickinson, supra note 20, at 165 n.180 (noting that the plaintiff’s strategy in Olson 
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 649 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1979), may have been “to obtain a 
speedy recovery and avoid costly litigation with numerous defendants, [by having] the 
plaintiff . . . select the smallest co-conspirator that in its estimation has sufficient assets to pay 
the potential judgment and file suit naming only that party as a defendant”). The court, 
however, did not acknowledge this point. See Olson Farms, 649 F.2d at 1380 (Holloway, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“We do not have a record or evidence in the instant 
case indicating the reasons why Olson Farms was sued and the defendants-appellees were 
ignored.”). 
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all. Indeed, the plaintiff could decide to sue just one member of the 
cartel and to hold that firm liable for trebled damages on the total 
injuries inflicted by the entire cartel.62 While rare, plaintiffs have sued 
only one alleged conspirator on occasion.63 Some see injustice in 
granting so much power to an antitrust plaintiff in high-stakes 
litigation.64 
Critics of the no-contribution regime suspect that antitrust 
plaintiffs are abusing their power to select the initial defendants and 
the settlement order. They hypothesize three distasteful scenarios. 
First, contribution proponents assert that plaintiffs make sweetheart 
deals with the most culpable defendant or defendants. Some 
commentators assert that, in determining the order of settlements, an 
antitrust 
plaintiff will naturally look to those defendants that it perceives to 
be the most in need of obtaining a release from the action. Often 
these will be defendants that are potentially liable for a 
proportionately large share of the total damages and are thus quite 
anxious to limit their exposure through settlement.65 
Under this thinking, the most culpable defendant may feel uniquely 
vulnerable and thus seek out an early settlement.66 
 
 62. See, e.g., Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963) 
(“A plaintiff need not sue all conspirators; he may choose to sue but one.”). 
 63. The most famous instance is perhaps Olson Farms, in which the plaintiff sued only the 
smallest egg buyer in an alleged buyers’ cartel and the defendant was held liable for damages far 
in excess to its business relationship with the plaintiff. See Olson Farms, 649 F.2d at 1380 
(Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 64. See Prof’l Beauty Supply, 594 F.2d at 1185–86 (“There is an obvious lack of sense and 
justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of restitution of a loss for which two parties are 
responsible to be placed upon one alone because of the plaintiff’s whim or spite, or his collusion 
with the other wrongdoer.”); Jacobson, supra note 51, at 238 (“It is unfair to allow plaintiffs to 
single out one defendant to satisfy the liability of many. It is unfair to compel a single defendant 
to pay treble damages for an entire industry’s liability. And it is unfair to force a defendant to 
abandon its defense and settle simply because of the coercive impact of earlier settlements with 
more culpable parties.”). 
 65. Dickinson, supra note 20, at 179; see also Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, 
supra note 25, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Bayh, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[W]e 
have to be aware that in a large antitrust suit . . . a small or medium-sized company could easily 
face legal responsibility on behalf of the entire industry . . . while larger, more culpable 
businesses go relatively free . . . .”). 
 66. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 36–37 (statement of 
Sen. Bayh, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 67 (statement of Donald G. Kempf, Jr.). 
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Second, commentators assert that antitrust plaintiffs can exploit 
the whipsaw threat to coerce large settlements out of innocent 
defendants.67 They argue that even defendants acquitted of criminal 
price-fixing may nonetheless feel pressured to settle follow-on private 
civil lawsuits.68 Supporters of contribution rights assert that 
defendants who maintain their innocence “have, as a practical matter, 
been forced to settle without regard to liability or damage caused.”69 
Third, the absence of contribution might be particularly unfair to 
small players with lower market shares because, according to some 
commentators, antitrust plaintiffs do not offer them the same 
favorable terms offered to cartel ringleaders.70 The most extreme 
example of this phenomenon occurs when the plaintiff brings suit 
against only one small defendant in lieu of suing any of the larger 
potential defendants.71 Because the whipsaw creates the potential for 
crippling liability should the plaintiff prevail, even a minor player in 
the cartel may consent to a significant settlement to avoid the risk of 
being held liable for three times the amount of all of the injury caused 
by the cartel.72 Characterizing such settlement pressure on small 
 
 67. See, e.g., Note, supra note 15, at 907–10. 
 68. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1290. This does not seem particularly surprising 
given that the plaintiff’s burden of proof in private litigation is lower than the government’s in a 
criminal prosecution. Also, new evidence may have come to light between the criminal and civil 
proceedings. For example, Cargill, a provider of food and agricultural products, escaped 
criminal liability for its participation in the citric acid price-fixing conspiracy because definite 
evidence came to light too late. Compare In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1106 (9th Cir. 
1999) (noting that the government declined to prosecute Cargill and affirming summary 
judgment for Cargill in a follow-on civil suit), with David Barboza, Archer Daniels Executive 
Said To Tell of Price-Fixing Talks with Cargill Counterpart, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at C6 
(showing that Cargill participated in a price-fixing conspiracy). 
 69. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 53 (Report of the Section on 
Proposed Amendment of the Clayton Act to Permit Contribution in Damage Actions); see also 
Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 66–67 (statement of Donald G. 
Kempf, Jr.) (“The fact of the matter is that today antitrust settlements are being entered into 
which bear no necessary relationship to whether or not the defendants engaged in any improper 
conduct or whether or not the plaintiffs suffered any damage.”). 
 70. See Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1290. 
 71. See Note, supra note 15, at 908 (“By the latter stages of the whipsaw, a company 
directly responsible for only a small fraction of a plaintiff’s damages may alone face liability for 
damages caused by an entire industry.”); see also, e.g., id. at 904 (“Although Olson Farms was 
the smallest of the price-fixers by sales, the plaintiffs sued that company alone for treble 
damages. The judgment Olson Farms eventually paid amounted to twenty-four times the 
damages immediately caused by the company’s egg purchases.”). 
 72. See id. at 906. 
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players as fundamentally unfair, some commentators advocate 
contribution among price-fixing defendants, whether by statute or by 
contract.73 
A JSA ameliorates the whipsaw threat. Because JSAs 
theoretically make each defendant responsible only for the 
overcharges on its own sales, early settlements made by some 
defendants do not create additional pressure on the remaining 
defendants to settle on onerous terms. Courts have approved 
judgment-sharing agreements as a mechanism to “minimize the 
likelihood of these coercive settlements by equitably apportioning 
any judgment that might be entered against the defendants.”74 The 
Manual for Complex Litigation endorses JSAs because they “serve 
the legitimate purposes of controlling parties’ exposure and 
preventing plaintiffs from forcing an unfair settlement by threats to 
show favoritism in the collection of any judgment that may be 
recovered.”75 With a JSA in place, antitrust plaintiffs will not 
generally be able to successfully employ the whipsaw strategy to 
pressure price-fixing defendants to settle.76 Even those opposed to 
amending the Sherman Act to allow contribution in antitrust cases 
point to JSAs as a mechanism to solve the whipsaw problem without 
creating a broad statutory right to contribution.77 
B. Benefits for Antitrust Enforcement: Deterrence and 
Overdeterrence 
In addition to fairness arguments, JSA supporters argue that 
these contracts could also serve the goals of antitrust policy by 
enhancing deterrence and diminishing the risk of overdeterrence. 
Most of the antitrust contribution debate in the post–Texas Industries 
era focused on whether a right to contribution would enhance or 
 
 73. See, e.g., A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 20–23. 
 74. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 
WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (mem.). 
 75. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.23. 
 76. Cf. Note, supra note 15, at 910 (discussing how a contribution rule would reduce 
whipsawing). 
 77. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 68 (Minority Report on 
Contribution) (“If plaintiffs truly are using their leverage arising from defendants’ joint and 
several liability in an abusive manner, defendants already have at their disposal the weapon 
needed to redress the imbalance. Sharing agreements, enthusiastically endorsed in the Majority 
Report, can provide desired protection and without creating disabling uncertainty.”). 
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inhibit deterrence of illegal price fixing. The procontribution camp 
argued that contribution would better deter firms from joining price-
fixing conspiracies. Because JSAs are essentially contribution by 
contract, their rationales apply in large part to JSAs as well. 
Proponents of contribution in antitrust have advanced two 
related deterrence arguments in support of creating a right to 
contribution among price-fixing defendants. First, they argue that a 
right to contribution increases the probability that each cartel 
participant will pay antitrust damages.78 The absence of contribution 
is said to reduce deterrence because some conspirators can escape 
liability.79 For example, in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National 
Beauty Supply, Inc.,80 the only antitrust case to actually recognize a 
right to contribution, the Eighth Circuit asserted, 
[O]n balance a rule allowing contribution is actually a greater 
deterrent. The fact that one tortfeasor may be held liable for all the 
damages arising from the antitrust violation necessarily means that 
other joint tortfeasors may go “scot free”. This possibility of es-
caping all liability might cause many to be more willing, rather than 
less willing, to engage in wrongful activity. 
  . . . To deny contribution would be to dilute the deterrent effect 
of the antitrust laws, since a participant in an antitrust violation 
could escape all responsibility for its wrongdoing.81 
This position assumes that the greater certainty of some 
punishment necessarily increases deterrence. Applying this 
procontribution argument to JSAs, some commentators have argued 
that JSAs should not reduce deterrence of price fixing because each 
alleged conspirator faces a greater probability of having to pay 
something.82 So long as any defendant is found liable, no signatory to 
 
 78. Dickinson, supra note 20, at 187–90. 
 79. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 69 (statement of 
Donald G. Kempf, Jr.) (“[Contribution] improves the deterrent force of our price-fixing laws. 
Violators will not go unpunished, as they can now.”). 
 80. Prof’l Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Nat’l Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979), 
abrogated by Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
 81. Id. at 1185. 
 82. See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 7, at 312 (“Risk-neutral potential violators are unlikely to 
be less deterred under a sharing agreement because the resulting reduced amount of potential 
liability is offset by the increased probability of having to make at least some payments.”). 
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the JSAs can escape payment. The increased probability of payment 
increases deterrence, according to this theory.83 
Second, some contribution proponents assert that antitrust 
deterrence does not depend on joint and several liability without 
contribution. Rather, they argue that the mandatory trebling of 
antitrust damages sufficiently deters price-fixing conspiracies.84 
Further, criminal sanctions—including nine-figure fines and 
imprisonment—dissuade firms from price fixing. Indeed, some 
commentators assert that in light of criminal penalties, “it is very 
unlikely that the management of any company is making such [cost-
benefit] analysis” as to whether to join a price-fixing cartel.85 In sum, 
because the combined threats of criminal liability and treble-damage 
private suits deter cartelization, allowing contribution should not 
reduce deterrence.86 By extension, allowing price-fixing defendants to 
allocate responsibility through private JSAs should not detract from 
the primary deterrents of antitrust conspiracies. 
Beyond arguing that contribution would not undermine 
antitrust’s deterrence goal, some proponents argue that the absence 
of contribution, combined with joint and several liability, creates a 
risk of overdeterrence87 because the prospect of high damages might 
convince a company not to undertake arrangements that would be 
 
 83. See S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 9 (1979) (“[I]n a regulatory scheme, where one of the goals is 
to deter destructive or illegal behavior, the best way to do so is to require that all of those 
responsible for the wrong pay their part of the liability. This ensures that no one gets out of the 
suit without paying for the wrong committed.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 233 (letter from Hon. 
Charles B. Renfrew, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, to members of the H. Subcomm. on 
Monopolies and Commercial Law). 
 85. Id. at 47 (statement of Thomas R. Long). 
 86. See id. at 118 (statement of Donald T. Hibner, Jr.) (“Most businessmen are not aware 
of contribution or noncontribution. What is a deterrent, and what they know about, are treble 
damages, fines, imprisonment, and class actions.”); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, 
at 24–25 (“Proponents also claim that the threat of criminal liability and to a lesser extent treble 
damages, not joint and several liability, are the true deterrents to price fixing and other 
anticompetitive activity. As one attorney testified, ‘[a]ny corporate executive foolish enough to 
engage in such activities in the face of those risks would hardly be deterred by the lack of a 
contribution statute.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, 
supra note 25, at 39 (statement of Denis McInerney, Esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel))). 
 87. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 25 (“[P]roponents claim that joint 
and several liability can overdeter conduct which is subject to antitrust scrutiny but may be 
procompetitive or competitively neutral.”); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 8, at 30–35, 
40–44. 
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legal and procompetitive.88 Federal courts have long recognized the 
risk that antitrust laws might overdeter legitimate business behavior.89 
Even though the Supreme Court declined to recognize a right to 
contribution among antitrust defendants, it nonetheless 
acknowledged that “any discussion of this problem must consider the 
problem of ‘overdeterrence,’ i.e., the possibility that severe antitrust 
penalties will chill wholly legitimate business agreements.”90 
According to this view, fear of antitrust liability could deter firms 
from pursuing efficient collaborations, such as distributional joint 
ventures. Because a JSA could prevent overdeterrence by minimizing 
the maximum amount of damages if such a collaboration were found 
to be an antitrust violation, JSAs might facilitate a more efficient 
antitrust regime. 
Finally, some assert that the no-contribution rule increases the 
likelihood that price-fixing litigation will force a defendant to declare 
bankruptcy and exit the market, which would reduce competition in 
the market. In the absence of JSAs, joint and several liability creates 
a risk of bankruptcy when there is one holdout defendant or, perhaps, 
when the plaintiff sues only one defendant. Some courts have noted 
the bankruptcy risk, especially given the automatic trebling of 
antitrust damages.91 To the extent that JSAs prevent any one firm in a 
concentrated industry from getting hit with an antitrust damage 
award that would force the firm from the market, JSAs can increase 
competition, so the reasoning goes. 
 
 88. See Note, supra note 15, at 911 (“Excessive penalties can cause businesses to shun 
competitive practices lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct . . . for example . . . 
refus[ing] to release price information for fear that it may be interpreted as price-fixing.”). 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978) (“[There exists] 
the distinct possibility of overdeterrence; salutary and procompetitive conduct lying close to the 
borderline of impermissible conduct might be shunned by businessmen who chose to be 
excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to criminal 
punishment for even a good-faith error of judgment.”); see also S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 18 (1979). 
 90. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 636–37 (1981) (citing U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 441–42). 
 91. See, e.g., Arth Main St. Drugs v. Beer Distribs. of Ind., Inc., No. F 77-73, 1978 WL 1357, 
at *3 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 1978) (mem.) (asserting that the treble damages could bankrupt 
antitrust defendants); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 793 (1987) (“Where actual damages are high, 
mandatory trebling may impair a firm’s ability to compete after judgment.”). 
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III.  THE CASE AGAINST JUDGMENT-SHARING AGREEMENTS 
Although JSAs may seem like a reasonable way for defendants 
to manage litigation costs, they also present many anticompetitive 
dangers. First, JSAs may interfere with the settlement process in a 
manner that reduces deterrence of price fixing. Second, JSAs may 
help price-fixing firms conceal an illegal conspiracy. Third, JSAs may 
represent a cartel-stabilizing device by solving one of the collective 
action problems associated with illegal price-fixing. As a result, JSAs 
may have the net effect of undermining cartel deterrence and 
facilitating price-fixing conspiracies. 
A. Judgment-Sharing Agreements Distort the Settlement Process 
In general, antitrust law favors settlement. The Supreme Court 
has opined that policies that promote settlement are “most consistent 
with the aims and purposes of the treble damage remedy under the 
antitrust laws.”92 Not only do settlements conserve judicial resources 
by avoiding expensive trials,93 but if “settlements are discouraged, it 
may be more difficult for plaintiffs to bring meritorious claims, obtain 
redress for consumers, and deter unlawful behavior.”94 Not all 
settlements, though, help achieve antitrust’s twin goals of 
compensation and deterrence; the terms matter. As Professors 
Easterbrook, Landes, and Posner have recognized, “settlement terms, 
no less than damages awarded in litigated cases, determine the 
deterrent effect of antitrust rules.”95 If particular rules systematically 
reduce settlement amounts below their optimal level, deterrence 
suffers. 
Although some have suggested that JSAs should not affect 
settlement amounts,96 that conclusion is logically suspect for several 
reasons. First, absent a JSA, the race to settle early should increase 
 
 92. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 346 (1971). 
 93. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 19 (statement of Stephen 
D. Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan). 
 94. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 39. 
 95. Frank H. Easterbrook, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among 
Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331, 354 (1980). 
 96. E.g., Riemer, supra note 7, at 315 (“[T]he fact that sharing agreements affect the terms 
of settlements is irrelevant to the goal of compensation. These agreements may affect the 
ultimate apportionment of a judgment among defendants, but they do not, in any way, cause a 
reduction in the amount of the judgment that a plaintiff can recover.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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settlement values as defendants compete against each other to exit 
the litigation.97 A shrewd antitrust plaintiff can play two or more 
defendants against each other, essentially having the defendants bid 
for the prize of settling first and avoiding both trial and the end of the 
whipsaw.98 In the absence of contribution, joint and several liability 
means that the expected cost of losing at trial is greater. This should 
increase the reservation price that a defendant is willing to pay to 
avoid the risk of trial. The no-contribution rule encourages settlement 
because defendants are willing to pay dearly to avoid the risk of a 
greater payout should they lose at trial. In contrast, a JSA may 
prevent co-conspirators from bidding against each other in 
negotiations with the plaintiff.99 Indeed, the reason that most 
defendants enter into JSAs is to avert any “rush to settlement.”100 By 
eliminating the risk of the whipsaw, JSAs reduce firms’ incentives to 
settle private antitrust litigation.101 Indeed, this is the entire theory 
behind the unfairness arguments in favor of creating contribution 
rights for defendants in price-fixing cases. As a result, JSAs likely 
depress settlement amounts. 
Second, the primary justification for JSAs is to prevent the so-
called whipsaw effect. The whipsaw allegedly coerces defendants into 
paying larger settlements than they otherwise would. To the extent 
that JSAs successfully prevent this whipsaw, they reduce the 
plaintiff’s leverage and should consequently reduce the aggregate 
settlements received by antitrust plaintiffs.102 Indeed, some courts 
 
 97. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at 365 (“A rule of no contribution creates 
competition among defendants to settle rather than litigate. Each defendant dreads being the 
last to settle, because every time one defendant settles the expected liability of the remainder 
increases. The plaintiff can use this fear to obtain a larger aggregate settlement under a no-
contribution rule than he could expect to obtain if all of the defendants litigated.”). 
 98. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 40 (“Economic analysis suggests that 
the rule of no contribution produces higher aggregate settlements by fostering competition 
among defendants to settle early.”). 
 99. See DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 320–54 (2004) (discussing the auction houses 
price-fixing class action lawsuit). 
 100. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1327 n.271 (“[I]n the In re Antibiotics Antitrust Cases, the 
five defendants entered into a sharing agreement and thereby avoided any ‘rush to 
settlement.’”). 
 101. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 94–96 (testimony of 
Harold Kohn, Attorney). 
 102. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 237 (testimony of William 
W. Schwarzer, J., Northern District of California) (“I think that it is probably true that the cases 
would be settled at lower amounts than now because of the decline in the plaintiff’s leverage.”). 
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have praised JSAs precisely for “discouraging coerced settlements.”103 
Yet if each defendant is paying a smaller individual settlement, then 
the aggregate settlement amount must also be lower. Consistency 
precludes JSA proponents from praising the settling-reducing effects 
of JSAs while simultaneously purporting that JSAs should not affect 
settlement amounts. 
Third, a JSA can reduce the value of early settlements because 
JSAs sometimes require any settling defendant to negotiate a term in 
its settlement agreement whereby the plaintiff agrees “not to seek 
damages from nonsettling defendants attributable to the settling 
defendants’ sales.”104 The settling defendant must ensure that the final 
settlement with the plaintiff includes such a carve-out provision 
because if it does not, then the other signatories have a contractual 
right to sue the settling defendant for contribution as described in the 
JSA.105 By forcing the settling defendant to include this carve-out 
provision, the JSA ensures that the other settling defendants will not 
be liable for the settling defendant’s overcharges. The plaintiff must 
disclaim any further interest in the settling defendant’s overcharges, 
whereas under ordinary joint and several liability, the plaintiff would 
still be able to collect from the nonsettling defendants the difference 
between the settling defendant’s overcharges (trebled) and the 
settlement amount. Thus, JSA carve-out provisions decrease the 
value of the overall litigation to an antitrust plaintiff by preventing 
the plaintiff from factoring the settling defendant’s overcharges into 
damage awards against the co-conspirators. In essence, these JSA 
provisions eliminate joint and several liability.106 
 
 103. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 
WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (mem.). 
 104. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 19; see also Antitrust Damage Allocation 
Hearings, supra note 25, at 142 (statement of Robert P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & 
Sutro) (“Although diverse, such agreements typically apportion liability under some agreed-
upon formula, often market share, and provide that if any signatory defendant settles it must 
require the plaintiff to reduce any judgment obtained against the other signatories by the 
settling defendant’s percentage share under the agreement or alternatively to remain 
contractually responsible to the other signatories for any difference.”). 
 105. Riemer, supra note 7, at 306 (“[B]ecause a settling defendant is relieved of liability to 
the non-settling defendants only if the settlement agreement contains a claim reduction or 
carve-out provision, defendants will have little incentive to settle unless plaintiffs agree to such a 
provision.” (footnote omitted)). 
 106. See S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 36 (1979) (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. 
Kennedy). 
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In addition to diminishing the value of settlements, JSAs reduce 
the probability of settlement for two reasons. First, JSAs reduce the 
defendants’ incentive to settle by significantly limiting each 
defendant’s potential exposure. As Judge Hubert Will noted in his 
Congressional testimony, contribution in antitrust cases would 
“substantially deter settlements because it would reduce the 
defendant’s risks, and anything that reduces his risks reduces the 
incentive to settle.”107 Second, JSAs can complicate the settlement 
process because the settling defendant has to negotiate to protect the 
nonsettling defendants. As noted, JSAs sometimes “contain 
provisions requiring a settling defendant to extract an agreement 
from the plaintiff to reduce its claims against the nonsettling 
defendants by the amount of damages for which the settling 
defendant would have been responsible absent any settlement.”108 
Antitrust practitioners have long recognized that a defendant 
seriously interested in settling has a better chance for success by 
going it alone. Besides being able to plead its own cause most 
effectively, it can avoid the quagmire of the conflicting interests of 
its fellow bargainer-competitors, and gain a possible competitive 
advantage by either early settlement or by settlement on its own 
terms.109 
Even a price-fixing defendant that strongly prefers settlement may be 
unable to offer a deal that satisfies both the terms of the JSA and the 
needs of the plaintiff.110 Although settlements still happen with 
 
 107. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 270 (testimony of Hubert L. 
Will, J., Northern District of Illinois). 
 108. Mark D. Plevin, Avoiding Problems in Joint Defense Groups, 23 LITIGATION 41, 44 
(1996); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 7 (statement of A. 
Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (“Such an agreement provides, among other things, 
that no defendant will settle unless the plaintiffs surrender their claim for damages attributable 
to that defendant’s sales.”); Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 121 
(statement of Donald T. Hiber) (“If a defendant settles, he must insure that the plaintiffs will 
not seek recovery from others based upon alleged overcharges on the settling defendant’s sales. 
If the settling defendant does not ‘remove his sales from suit’ he will be liable to the remaining 
defendants.”). 
 109. H. Robert Halper, The Unsettling Problems of Settlement in Antitrust Damage Cases, 32 
ANTITRUST L.J. 98, 99–100 (1966). 
 110. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 93 (statement of Harold E. 
Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) (stating that contribution rights among 
antitrust defendants would “in many instances” make settlement “impossible”). 
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JSAs,111 anecdotal evidence suggests that signatories to a sharing 
agreement may be less likely to settle than nonsignatories.112 
Despite such reasoning and evidence, courts have rejected 
arguments that JSAs improperly reduce the incentive for settlement. 
For example, the district judge in one case, Cimarron Pipeline 
Construction v. National Council on Compensation Insurance,113 
agreed with the defendants’ position “that the sharing agreement 
does not disrupt the settlement process and in fact makes the 
settlement negotiations more equitable by alleviating the need for a 
party to settle merely to avoid the sometimes disastrous costs of 
extensive litigation.”114 The court’s reasoning proves the opposite 
point: by minimizing the threat of litigation, JSAs reduce the 
defendants’ incentive to settle with the plaintiff. That reduction of 
pressure may be good or bad depending on one’s perspective, but it 
exists. The court stood on firmer ground when it noted that the 
plaintiffs in the case had “in fact reached settlement agreements with 
over 60 percent of the signatories to the sharing agreement.”115 But 
the argument is not that JSAs make settlement impossible; rather, 
JSAs make settlements harder to reach and may reduce settlement 
values for the plaintiff.116 
Finally, by reducing the likelihood of early settlements, JSAs 
may interfere with the funding and evidence-gathering processes of 
legitimate antitrust cases. First, JSAs may hinder victims of price-
fixing conspiracies from successfully litigating their claims by 
interfering with the financing of antitrust lawsuits. Small plaintiffs 
 
 111. See S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 25. 
 112. See, e.g., Cimarron Pipeline Constr. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Nos. CIV-89-822-T, 
CIV-89-1886-T, 1992 WL 350612, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 1992). 
Indeed, one of the purported justifications for JSAs is that they forestall settlements. For 
example, one source argues that “a judgment-sharing agreement may be appropriate where 
there is a meritorious defense and the defendants want to make sure that none of the other 
defendants settle.” Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitust, 5 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 
IN FEDERAL COURTS § 61, § 61.7 (Robert L. Haig ed., 2d ed. 2008). While Professor Cavanaugh 
supports JSAs when the defendants have a meritorious defense, the settlement-precluding effect 
of a JSA exists regardless of whether the defendants have a meritorious defense. 
 113. Cimarron Pipeline Constr. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Nos. CIV-89-822-T, CIV-89-
886-T, 1992 WL 350612 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 1992). 
 114. Id. at *3. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 94–95 (statement of 
Harold E. Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf). 
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that pursue antitrust claims are less successful than larger plaintiffs.117 
One reason may be that antitrust litigation is expensive and only 
plaintiffs with sufficiently deep pockets can persevere. Absent 
financing, many plaintiffs cannot survive the war of attrition that is 
antitrust litigation.118 Plaintiffs often rely on partial, incremental 
settlements to fund the litigation against the remaining defendants.119 
By impeding this funding mechanism, JSAs might deter or derail 
legitimate suits.120 
Second, early settling defendants often provide critical evidence 
to support the plaintiff’s claims. Although some may argue that many 
private price-fixing lawsuits rely on successful previous government 
actions that provide all of the necessary evidence to prove liability, 
the evidence secured through discovery is important even in follow-
on cases. First, in many cases, the private price-fixing lawsuit precedes 
any government prosecution.121 Second, even when a private lawsuit 
follows a successful government case, plaintiffs’ attorneys often need 
more evidence than prosecutors have collected.122 For example, 
 
 117. Jeffrey M. Perloff, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Paul Ruud, Antitrust Settlements and Trial 
Outcomes, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 401, 407 (1996). 
 118. Joseph L. Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 92 
(1966) (“[A] war of attrition [is] carried on as an accepted method of defence by the large 
defendants and their attorneys; any suggestion that the plaintiff may not be adequately financed 
will result in stretching out the pretrial process by various devices.”). 
 119. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.21 (“Such partial settlements 
may provide funds needed to pursue the litigation . . . .”); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation 
Hearings, supra note 25, at 8 (statement of A. Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (“Partial 
settlements, or settlements with fewer than all the defendants, have served as a crucial 
preliminary step in achieving comprehensive settlements of complex antitrust litigation.”). 
 120. S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 40 (1979) (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. 
Kennedy) (“Allowing contribution would discourage . . . settlements and make it much more 
difficult for the plaintiff to ultimately prevail. The more difficulty the plaintiff faces, the less likely 
such suits will be brought, the less likely plaintiffs will succeed, and the less likely would-be 
violators will be deterred.” (alteration in the original) (quoting Alabama v. Bluebird Body Co., 
No. 75-23-N, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Ala. May 18, 1979))). 
 121. See, e.g., JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 314 (2001) (“Boies & Schiller filed 
a civil price-fixing suit in U.S. District Court in Dallas, Texas on behalf of several direct 
purchasers of bulk vitamins in March 1998. It would be more than one year before the 
government indicted Hoffmann-La Roche, BASF, and others for the same crimes.”). 
 122. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 245, 266 (N.D. Ill. 1979) 
(“Nonetheless, it can also be said that prior criminal proceedings are generally narrower in 
scope than any civil action and helpful, from a discovery viewpoint, only in the beginning. 
Where all or most of the defendants plead Nolo soon after indictments have been handed down, 
government evidence gathering comes to a halt and the civil plaintiffs must do considerable 
discovery work on their own.”). 
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private price-fixing cases are often broader than government cases in 
that private cases often allege that the price-fixing covered more 
products over a longer time frame.123 In short, in many cases, “[t]he 
only way the plaintiff can get evidence is to find someone involved in 
the conspiracy who has nothing to lose, and in effect give them some 
kind of informal immunity” in a settlement agreement.124 
Unfortunately, JSAs may undermine the evidence-gathering process, 
as the following Section explains. 
In sum, JSAs can reduce the amount that price-fixing defendants 
pay in the aggregate. This can reduce the attractiveness of bringing 
legitimate antitrust suits and could undermine deterrence of price-
fixing conspiracies, as Part IV discusses. 
B.  Judgment-Sharing Agreements Can Help Conceal a Cartel 
The first rule of cartel membership is “don’t get caught.” All 
cartel members share a common interest in concealing their activities. 
A price-fixing conspiracy exposed during private litigation can lead to 
criminal prosecutions, possibly resulting in massive criminal fines 
against cartel firms and prison time for the individuals involved.125 
Consequently, cartels go to great lengths to hide their crimes. Price 
fixers employ code names, use public phones, falsify travel itineraries 
when they meet with competitors,126 and create shell trade 
associations with fake agendas.127 In the aftermath of the electrical 
equipment cartels, participants explained 
 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 252; see also ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON 
CLASS ACTIONS § 18:57 (4th ed. 2002) (“Plaintiffs’ counsel will usually seek, initially at least, to 
recover damages based on the entire alleged conspiracy period, when it is longer than four 
years . . . .”). 
 124. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 28 (statement of Stephen D. 
Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan). 
 125. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, 
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, 
if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court.”). 
 126. Gilbert Geis, White Collar Criminal: The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Case in 
1961, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL 103, 107 (Gilbert Geis ed., 1968); see also, e.g., JAMES B. 
LIEBER, RATS IN THE GRAIN: THE DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF ARCHER DANIELS 
MIDLAND 221 (2000) (discussing the lysine cartel and measures taken to conceal the cartel). 
 127. John Gibeaut, Antitrust American Style, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2004, at 55, 58 (“Cartels are 
especially hard to detect because members can reach secret agreements under the cover of 
social connections, trade associations, mutual business contacts and other legitimate 
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the techniques of concealment: “. . . to minimize telephone calls, to 
use plain envelopes if mailing material to each other, not to be seen 
together on traveling, and so forth. . . . not to leave wastepaper, of 
which there was a lot, strewn around a room when leaving.”128 
And when price-fixing firms fear that the conspiracy may be exposed, 
they often attempt to destroy all incriminating documents.129 
Although cartel rules commonly prohibit participants from 
taking notes or documenting the price-fixing activity, cartels often 
include an individual or two who disobeys the ban on record-
keeping.130 While individuals may keep notes for many reasons—such 
as fastidiousness, or to hold cartel partners accountable should a 
dispute among co-conspirators arise about the substance of earlier 
agreements—the notes are often cashed in as makeshift insurance 
policies when the cartel unravels.131 Participants in price-fixing cartels 
routinely create incriminating documents but conceal them until it is 
in their best interest to reveal them. For example, in the auction-
house price-fixing cartel between Sotheby’s and Christie’s, the heads 
of Sotheby’s (Dede Brooks) and Christie’s (Christopher Davidge) 
fixed nonnegotiable sellers’ commissions and agreed to not 
memorialize their illegal agreement in writing.132 Brooks honored 
their agreement and believed that her partner in crime was abiding by 
their agreement as well. She was wrong. Although Davidge did 
respect his promise to fix commissions, unbeknownst to anyone else 
 
circumstances.”). 
 128. Geis, supra note 126, at 107 (second alteration in original) (quoting Administered 
Prices: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 87th Cong. pt. 27 (1961)). 
 129. See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 126, at 155–56. 
 130. See Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1641–48 (2008). 
 131. Cécile Aubert, Patrick Rey & William E. Kovacic, The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-
Blowing Programs on Cartels, 24 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1241, 1260 (2006) (explaining that cartel 
members take notes because cartel “agreements may be very complex, due to the variety of 
products and prices involved, and to the number of possible contingencies; limited memory may 
then call for keeping notes about the agreement”); see also, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MASON, THE 
ART OF THE STEAL 142 (2003) (describing a price fixer who “thought it wise to keep a record of 
[price-fixing] discussions in case of any unforeseen repercussions”); Douglas Frantz, Private 
Files Fuel an Art Auction Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, at A1 (describing notes that were 
taken in the Christie’s case that were handed over to the Department of Justice). 
 132. MASON, supra note 131, at 140–41 (providing the entire series of events in the Christie’s 
case in detail). 
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he created copious notes after each illegal meeting.133 He documented 
his one-on-one conversations with his boss, Anthony Tennant (the 
CEO of Christie’s), his negotiations and agreements with Brooks, and 
what Brooks had told him about her discussions with Alfred 
Taubman (the CEO of Sotheby’s), whose meetings with Tennant had 
set the cartel in motion.134 These notes were ultimately critical to 
antitrust authorities securing guilty pleas by Sotheby’s and Christie’s 
and a criminal conviction of Taubman, who was sentenced to a year 
and a day in federal prison, and fined $7.5 million.135 In short, 
evidence of illegal price-fixing often exists; the difficulty is uncovering 
it. 
Prior to any settlements, codefendants in many types of litigation 
share an incentive to conceal evidence of price fixing. In general, the 
plaintiff’s failure to discover all relevant evidence from the 
defendants before settling remains a significant problem in civil 
litigation.136 The incentive to conceal bad evidence is compounded in 
price-fixing cases because a diligent private plaintiff can expose a 
criminal conspiracy that the government will later prosecute. Thus, it 
is hardly surprising that antitrust defendants fail to produce 
nonprivileged documents that are responsive to plaintiffs’ discovery 
requests when the documents demonstrate the existence of a price-
fixing conspiracy.137 As a result, price fixers may escape liability 
simply for the plaintiff’s want of evidence. 
Settlements, however, can lead to the exposure of incriminating 
evidence. Traditional settlements in price-fixing cases—without 
JSAs—often require the settling defendants to assist plaintiffs with 
discovery.138 In discussing settlements, plaintiffs’ attorneys in price-
fixing cases often seek evidence as much as money.139 Price fixers who 
desire to minimize their monetary exposure are sometimes willing to 
 
 133. See id. at 142. 
 134. Id. at 2–3. 
 135. Id. at 360. 
 136. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal 
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 811–13. 
 137. See Alioto, supra note 118, at 92–93. 
 138. See, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 296 F. Supp. 2d 568, 575 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
 139. See, e.g., BOIES, supra note 99, at 340 (“After our meeting with the Christie’s lawyers, 
Richard, Phil, and I sat down to try to structure a settlement offer that would induce Christie’s 
to pay the class a substantial amount of money and, equally important, provide us with the 
evidence we were missing to establish a buyers’ commission conspiracy.”). 
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supply incriminating documents and even necessary testimony at trial 
against their former cartel partners.140 The joint and several liability 
allows plaintiffs to negotiate liability releases in exchange for 
evidence. The first settler is often willing to supply inside evidence in 
order to reduce its liability. The plaintiff is willing to accept this 
reduced amount of money because the joint and several liability 
means that the plaintiff can recover any foregone money from the 
remaining defendants, against whom the plaintiff can make a better 
case after receiving evidence from the first settler. Indeed, because 
the nonsettling defendants remain liable for all of the damages, a 
prudent price-fixing plaintiff may grant a settlement for little or no 
money in exchange for incriminating evidence against its co-
conspirators.141 Furthermore, when early settlements have a money 
component, they can fund the plaintiff’s continued evidence 
gathering.142 
Although the whipsaw theory argues that “the plaintiff is able to 
use the leverage provided by the increase in liability as a means to 
coerce settlements from the remaining defendants,”143 this 
explanation fails to consider that the increased pressure may be 
attributable, in part, to the increased strength of the plaintiff’s case on 
the merits by the time that later settlements occur. Evidence secured 
from early-settling defendants may increase the settlement payments 
of later-settling defendants because the plaintiff’s case grows stronger 
as the plaintiff accumulates more evidence.144 The increased pressure 
to pay more money that later-settling defendants face is perfectly 
legitimate to the extent that it derives from the plaintiff’s stronger 
case. 
Judgment-sharing agreements can undermine this evidence-
producing dynamic. In the presence of a JSA, a defendant who has 
admissible proof of illegal activity—which it could use as leverage to 
 
 140. Id. at 340–41; Halper, supra note 109, at 113 n.25 (“[A settling antitrust] defendant 
might agree to make specific information available, or allow plaintiff to interview its 
employees.”). 
 141. BOIES, supra note 99, at 242 n.*. 
 142. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.21. 
 143. Dickinson, supra note 20, at 180–81. 
 144. This notion is consistent with the observation that “post discovery settlements are more 
likely to reflect the true value of the claim and be fair.” Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 
581, 588 (3d Cir. 1999) (alteration omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1314 
(3d Cir. 1993)). 
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get itself a sweetheart deal in an early settlement—may have 
insufficient incentive to share the information. Although any 
settlement might reduce that individual defendant’s direct liability, 
the evidence would lead to a greater probability of liability and higher 
damages for the remaining defendants and that first-settling party 
would bear a percentage of those damages pursuant to the terms of 
the JSA.145 Discussing JSAs in the context of multidefendant tort 
litigation, Professors Lisa Bernstein and Daniel Klerman explain that 
JSAs 
will affect the defendants’ trial strategy and their incentives to testify 
in particular ways at trial. For example, in the absence of such an 
agreement each defendant has an incentive to introduce evidence 
tending to place responsibility for the plaintiff’s harm on other 
defendants. In contrast, when a judgment-sharing agreement exists, 
the defendants will try to show that none of them were at fault. 
Finger pointing will be avoided, and it will be left to the plaintiff to 
introduce all of the evidence against each defendant. Each 
defendant will then have an incentive to testify in a way that 
minimizes the defendants’ total expected liability. Because the 
plaintiff will often have less information than each defendant about 
the cause of his harm, these agreements may decrease the likelihood 
that he will prevail.146 
Thus, critical evidence could be suppressed in cases in which the 
defendants have entered into a JSA, as the only individuals who are 
aware of the evidence have less incentive to share it with private 
plaintiffs. 
In sum, JSAs reduce incentives for co-conspirators to turn on 
each other. Normally, once a price-fixing cartel has been exposed, the 
best way to reduce one’s individual liability is to present evidence that 
shifts the blame to other members of the cartel. This is often done in 
the context of a settlement whereby the settling firm agrees to 
provide evidence against its former co-conspirators in exchange for a 
relatively low settlement amount. With a JSA in place, there is 
 
 145. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 51 (statement of John F. 
Seiberling, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[F]rom the practical standpoint of a 
plaintiff’s lawyer, it is going to be extremely difficult for him to proceed to collect evidence if 
everyone is liable for his pro rata share.”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, 
§ 13.23 (“[Sharing agreements] also create a disincentive for defendants to make available 
evidence indicating liability on the part of codefendants.”). 
 146. Bernstein & Klerman, supra note 23, at 2270 n.149. 
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significantly less incentive to engage in such finger pointing—after all, 
increasing the damages paid by one’s former cartel partners may 
increase the amount of money that the finger-pointer will eventually 
have to pay out pursuant to the JSA. In the absence of a JSA, each 
individual defendant has an overriding incentive to reduce its own 
exposure, regardless of the penalties paid by its co-conspirators. 
Indeed, because the other defendants are its competitors, it may 
benefit from a disproportionately low damage assessment because its 
competitors may have to charge a greater amount of money for their 
products in the future in order to recoup their higher damages. The 
JSA, however, shifts incentives, reduces the benefits of individual 
settlement, and thus reduces the pressure to expose cartel activity. 
C. Judgment-Sharing Agreements as a Solution to the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma 
Game theory illustrates how JSAs may stabilize price-fixing 
conspiracies and foster the concealment of cartel activity. Price-fixing 
conspiracies present many instances of prisoner’s dilemmas. 
1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma.  The prisoner’s dilemma is a game 
theory model based on two criminals who have committed a major 
crime and a minor crime. The police have sufficient evidence to 
convict both for the minor crime, but not enough to sustain 
convictions of either for the major crime. The police interrogate both 
suspects independently about their roles in the major crime but 
neither has confessed. The confession of either would be enough to 
convict the other of the major crime. Because the police want to 
convict at least one—and ideally both—of the prisoners for the major 
crime, they offer each the same deal: “If you confess and provide 
evidence against your partner, then you’ll get no jail time for either 
the minor or major crime and he’ll get a three-year sentence; if he 
confesses and you don’t, you’ll get the three-year sentence and he’ll 
walk. But, if both of you confess, we won’t need your testimony and 
both of you will get a two-year sentence. Finally, if neither of you 
confesses, then you’ll each get one year in prison on the minor crime. 
Your partner is being offered the same deal.” 
The offered deal is commonly depicted by the following matrix, 
which shows the payoff in jail time to each prisoner under each 
scenario: 
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Under this scheme, prisoners pursuing their own short-term self 
interest should confess. From Prisoner A’s perspective, if Prisoner B 
confesses, then Prisoner A can either confess and receive two years in 
prison or not confess and receive three years in prison. Framed in this 
manner, Prisoner A should confess in order to receive less time in 
prison. Conversely, if Prisoner B does not confess, then Prisoner A 
can either remain quiet and thus receive one year in prison on the 
minor crime or can confess and avoid imprisonment altogether. In 
this situation, Prisoner A should confess because no prison time is 
preferred over one year in prison. Thus, if Prisoner B confesses, 
Prisoner A is better off confessing, and if Prisoner B does not confess, 
Prisoner A is still better off confessing. This makes confession a 
dominant strategy because Prisoner A is better off confessing 
regardless of what Prisoner B does.147 
Prosecutors, however, have offered Prisoner B the same deal 
and, similarly, confession is Prisoner B’s dominant strategy as well. If 
each prisoner pursues this dominant strategy and confesses, then both 
prisoners will receive two years in prison for the major crime. If the 
prisoners were to cooperate and neither were to confess, then each 
would receive only a one-year prison sentence for the minor crime. 
This means that the mutual pursuit of the dominant strategy results in 
 
 147. A dominant strategy exists if a player is better off picking a particular option regardless 
of which course the player’s partner selects. Conversely, if a player could be better off changing 
the decision after learning the player’s partner’s choice, then no choice dominates the other 
under all circumstances and there is no dominant strategy and no true prisoner’s dilemma. 
LESLIE IN FINAL FOR WESTLAW AND LEXIS.DOC 2/19/2009  11:23:57 AM 
2009] JUDGMENT-SHARING AGREEMENTS 781 
 
a Pareto-inferior outcome because both prisoners could improve their 
position if the two could shift from the Confess-Confess outcome 
(two years in prison for each) to the Don’t Confess-Don’t Confess 
outcome (one year in prison for each). 
2. Cartels and the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  Cartel relationships are 
rife with prisoner’s dilemmas. The first, and most discussed, prisoner’s 
dilemma in any cartel arrangement involves the incentive of price-
fixing firms to cheat on their agreement by charging less than the 
fixed price. Although the firms are better off as a group with a stable 
cartel in which every firm charges the cartel-set price, each individual 
firm maximizes its own short-term profits by reducing its price and 
selling more than its cartel allotment.148 Such cheating can destabilize 
a cartel, resulting in price wars in which all firms are worse off than if 
every firm had abided by the cartel price. Cartel members also face 
prisoner’s dilemmas when deciding whether to cooperate with either 
a criminal antitrust prosecution or a civil price-fixing claim. 
 a. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Prosecuting Cartels.  The 
prisoner’s dilemma created by a criminal antitrust prosecution closely 
mirrors the classic prisoner’s dilemma because it presents co-
conspirators the opportunity to gain leniency by confessing. The key 
element in this dilemma is that antitrust authorities grant amnesty 
from criminal prosecution to the first member of a cartel to confess. 
The cartel members are better off as a group if they are silent (that is, 
if nobody confesses in exchange for amnesty) because the conspiracy 
remains hidden and they continue to make cartel profits. However, 
the only way that an individual firm can be guaranteed that it will not 
be criminally prosecuted is to be the first firm to confess. This can 
create the dynamic of a prisoner’s dilemma.149 
In 1993, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division reformed its Corporate 
Leniency Policy by making the process for awarding amnesty more 
structured and less discretionary. Under the government’s revamped 
Amnesty Program, the first confessor gets the best deal: no criminal 
liability and, in subsequent private lawsuits, liability limited to single 
 
 148. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 558 (2004). 
 149. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 453, 465–66 (2006) 
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damages for its own sales made at the cartel price.150 The second 
confessor gets the second best deal: a significant reduction in criminal 
fines (though no limitation on damages in follow-on private 
litigation). Each successive confessing firm receives a smaller discount 
off of its maximum criminal fine151 until every cartel member has 
confessed (or faces a criminal trial with an almost certain outcome, as 
the confessing cartel members must provide evidence against their 
former partners). 
The program has been wildly successful. The Amnesty Program 
has been the “most effective generator of cartel cases and is believed 
to be the most successful program in U.S. history for detecting large 
commercial crimes.”152 Before the new program, the government 
received one application per year from firms willing to expose a cartel 
in exchange for leniency; after the change in policy, applications 
increased to three per month.153 The Amnesty Program has led to the 
exposure of international cartels in marine transportation services, 
graphite electrodes, bromines, and vitamins,154 resulting in over one 
billion dollars in fines.155 In short, the government has successfully 
applied the insights of the prisoner’s dilemma in its Amnesty 
Program. 
Judgment-sharing agreements undermine the Amnesty Program. 
One reason for a price-fixing firm to confess first is to get single 
damages and avoid the whipsaw in civil litigation because the first 
confessor is not liable for treble damages or any damages associated 
with its co-conspirators’ sales regardless of whether that firm settles 
any subsequent private suit based on cartel activity first, last, or not at 
all. If a JSA eliminates the whipsaw, as claimed by its proponents, this 
significantly reduces the incentive to confess first in order to secure 
amnesty and resulting single damages. The Amnesty Program 
 
 150. 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2006) (Antitrust Enforcement Enhancements and Cooperation 
Incentives). In essence, the Amnesty Program eliminates both treble damages and joint and 
several liability for the first firm to confess. 
 151. Late-confessing firms also generally must sacrifice at least one executive, who must 
serve prison time. See Leslie, supra note 130, at 1660–61. 
 152. Gary R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for Reporting 
Violations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 799 (2001). 
 153. Kathryn K. Dyer & Garrett M. Liskey, Antitrust Violations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 195, 
224 (2008). 
 154. CONNOR, supra note 121, at 509. 
 155. Spratling, supra note 152, at 800. 
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succeeds by rewarding the first-confessing firm in a manner that 
creates distrust among cartel partners, as each must worry that one of 
its co-conspirators may take the bait and confess first.156 Because the 
costs of not confessing first are high, this creates distrust among the 
cartel members. By decreasing (often significantly) the marginal gains 
from confessing first, JSAs can moderate the distrust-creating effects 
of the Amnesty Program. As a result, JSAs can weaken the 
government’s most effective weapon for exposing, punishing, and 
deterring price-fixing conspiracies. 
 b. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Negotiating Private Settlements.  In 
addition to the cheating and confessing prisoner’s dilemmas, the 
process of negotiating settlements in private antitrust litigation 
against price fixers also represents a form of prisoner’s dilemma. 
Settlement negotiations provide yet another instance in which each 
firm must decide whether to maximize its individual short-term utility 
or to stay loyal to the cartel. Early in the cartel’s life, firms may be 
tempted to cheat or confess, but that temptation will be tempered by 
the fact that a firm’s defection could cause the demise of a profitable 
cartel. Once litigation has been filed, however, the cartel probably 
cannot continue business as usual and the lure of future cartel profits 
no longer figures as significantly into a firm’s decisionmaking calculus 
on whether to share evidence of the cartel’s activities. 
Nevertheless, the conspirators are generally better off as a group 
if they present a united no-settlement front against the antitrust 
plaintiff because none would fund the litigation or provide evidence 
that can be used against the remaining defendants. Each individual 
defendant, however, might perceive an advantage to striking a deal 
and settling first, based on the assumption that the first-settling 
defendant may receive the best deal. A so-called sweetheart 
settlement—in which the first settling defendant trades evidence for a 
lower settlement—is analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma model in 
which the prosecutors reward confession by offering less prison time. 
Firms may be worried that if they do not settle first, then one of 
their former partners will strike a deal with the plaintiff. As discussed 
above, settlement costs for holdout firms generally rise as their 
 
 156. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES AND 
RESOURCES FOR CORPORATE COUNSELORS 49 (2005) (“This ‘winner-takes-all’ dynamic 
generates tension and mistrust among cartel members.”). 
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codefendants settle because the earlier settlers have provided both a 
litigation war chest and (often) damning evidence. The plaintiff—now 
armed with funds and evidence—poses a more credible threat to the 
remaining defendants of going to trial and winning. In sum, each 
defendant maximizes its utility by settling first, but the defendants as 
a group do better if they negotiate as a group or decline to settle 
altogether.157 This is a prisoner’s dilemma because the group as a 
whole maximizes utility through mutual nonconfession, while each 
individual profits most by confessing. 
The most direct solution to the prisoner’s dilemma is an 
enforceable contract in which the prisoners contractually bind 
themselves not to confess or provide evidence against each other. 
Any such contract between criminal defendants—such as the suspects 
in the classic prisoner’s dilemma—would be unenforceable as a 
matter of public policy. Judgment-sharing agreements, however, can 
solve the prisoner’s dilemma by in essence committing the alleged co-
conspirators to a strategy of mutual nonconfession. The JSA helps 
prevent the settlement race by allowing defendants to present a 
united front against the plaintiff’s attempts to play co-conspirators 
against each other. With a JSA in place, each firm has less to gain by 
breaking ranks and settling. Although settling early would allow the 
firm to avoid litigation costs, depending on the terms of the JSA, any 
evidence that it provided as part of its settlement could increase the 
amount of damages at trial, of which it would be responsible for a 
percentage pursuant to the JSA. 
In short, a JSA may be a mechanism for cartel discipline at the 
settlement stage. Stable cartels require a minimal measure of 
discipline whereby the cartel members do not pursue their own 
individual interests—for example, by cutting price or exposing the 
cartel to the government in exchange for leniency—at the expense of 
their cartel partners. With each firm constraining its ability to trade 
evidence for a sweetheart deal, the JSA makes all members of the 
cartel better off. While a federal court would never countenance a 
private contract among defendants to conceal evidence or to not 
settle, the effect of such a forbidden contract may be achieved if 
courts fail to appreciate the anticompetitive potential of JSAs. 
 
 157. See Cirace, supra note 55, at 54–55. 
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IV.  BALANCING THE UNFAIRNESS AND DETERRENCE 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Parts II and III present very different characterizations of 
judgment-sharing agreements. The arguments in Part II see JSAs as 
legitimate risk-spreading mechanisms that mitigate the unfairness of 
the no-contribution regime in antitrust and may also increase 
deterrence. Part III suggests that JSAs may help stabilize and conceal 
cartels, which would necessarily reduce deterrence of price-fixing 
activity, and may decrease the chance of successful litigation of 
meritorious price-fixing claims, which could also reduce deterrence as 
well as leave the cartel’s victims uncompensated. This Part weighs the 
proffered fairness arguments and competing theories on deterrence 
and concludes that JSAs probably have a net negative effect on cartel 
deterrence. 
A.  Challenging the Unfairness Critique of the No-Contribution 
Regime 
Commentators defend JSAs as necessary to moderate the 
unfairness of plaintiffs’ coercive whipsaw tactics. Although facially 
persuasive, upon closer inspection the unfairness justification 
weakens considerably. This Section suggests that the unfairness 
argument is largely speculative and overstated. 
The premise of the unfairness argument—that many antitrust 
plaintiffs employ coercive whipsaw tactics—appears more theoretical 
than real. In particular, “there is little hard evidence that unfair 
whipsaw settlements are pervasive in the antitrust arena,”158 that 
antitrust plaintiffs target defendants for anticompetitive purposes,159 
or that there has been any “case in which a small, relatively less 
culpable defendant has actually paid an outlandish judgment resulting 
in bankruptcy.”160 Although there are a couple of well-trod anecdotes 
 
 158. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1302. 
 159. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 14 (“Although it has been suggested that 
a plaintiff may target a particular defendant to satisfy the judgment for anticompetitive 
purposes, there is no evidence to suggest that judgments have been disproportionately or 
unfairly executed on a widespread basis.”). 
 160. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 13 (testimony of Stephen D. 
Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan) (“There is no empirical evidence that any antitrust 
settlement or judgment has ever bankrupted a defendant.”); id. at 473 (statement of James F. 
Rill, Esq., Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott) (“I am not aware of any instance in which a company 
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of whipsawing creating a seemingly unfair result, there is no evidence 
of a systemic problem.161 Each anecdote “is subject to case-by-case 
rebuttals which rob it of much of its force.”162 
Although there are some well-known examples of antitrust 
plaintiffs suing only one alleged conspirator from a cartel,163 these 
cases are well-known because they are exceptional. For attorneys who 
bring private antitrust suits, “it is a generally recognized practice 
among plaintiffs to name as defendants as many of the co-
conspirators as may reasonably be expected to be liable, so as to 
ensure full recovery.”164 More importantly, even if some conspirators 
are not named as defendants by a particular plaintiff, “in any given 
case there may be any number of other potential plaintiffs who were 
damaged by the particular restraint of trade or monopoly in which the 
prospective third-party defendant has been a participant.”165 So if one 
 
has been forced into bankruptcy because of the execution of an adverse judgment rendered in 
an antitrust lawsuit.”); id. at 477 (statement of Robert P. Taylor) (“I am not aware of any 
situation in which a defendant has been forced into bankruptcy by having to satisfy an antitrust 
judgment.”); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 14 (“The Subcommittee has also 
been given few, if any, examples in which small defendants were forced to shoulder grossly 
disproportionate liability for nationwide conspiracies.” (quoting STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON 
THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO ALLOCATE DAMAGES AMONG 
DEFENDANTS IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION (Comm. Print 1983), reprinted in 44 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 280 (Feb. 10, 1983))). 
 161. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 17 (“Unfortunately, there is no 
systematic data which allows one to quantify the frequency or amounts of so-called coerced 
settlements.”); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1301 (“A careful review of the legislative debates 
concerning damage allocation reform suggests that the unfairness arguments have been 
generated by a few well-publicized cases. The problem is hence not as pervasive as it might 
appear at first glance.”). 
 162. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 18. 
 163. See, e.g., Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 649 F.2d 1370, 1372–73 (10th Cir. 
1979) (examining Olson Farms’s claim for contribution against Safeway Stores after Olson 
Farms had been previously found liable as the sole defendant in an antitrust suit). 
 164. Dickinson, supra note 20, at 172 (citing Peter G. Corbett, Apportionment of Damages 
and Contribution Among Coconspirators in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 31 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 111, 111 (1962)); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 236 
(testimony of William W. Schwarzer, J., Northern District of California) (“[I]n most antitrust 
cases, the plaintiffs tend to join all of those prospective or alleged wrongdoers who are solvent 
and are likely to be in a financial position to make a contribution, so it is not going to be a very 
common case in which a defendant will need to bring in additional parties, people that are 
obviously left out.”); Jacobson, supra note 51, at 235 (“In the typical complex price-fixing class 
action, plaintiffs almost invariably join all conceivable parties . . . .”). 
 165. Prof’l Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Nat’l Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1189 (8th Cir. 
1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting in part), abrogated by Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 
451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
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particular plaintiff decides to exclude its business partners as 
defendants, other potential plaintiffs could sue those price fixers who 
were not named in the previous lawsuit. 
Furthermore, the unfairness arguments espoused by proponents 
of contribution are premised on the relative culpability of the price-
fixing firms. Although some scholars talk about the possibility of “the 
most culpable defendants” paying less than “the least culpable 
defendants,”166 the degrees-of-culpability concept fails to describe 
most cartels. All members of the price-fixing cartel do the same thing; 
some just have a greater market share and thus profit more from the 
conspiracy.167 Simply because one firm in the cartel had a greater 
market share than another conspirator does not automatically mean 
the former is more culpable for the crime based merely on its greater 
volume of sales at the same artificially high price as its competitors. 
Even if one were to accept the premise that one firm is more 
culpable than the others, it would be difficult to identify this firm with 
any precision or consistency. That one firm has a greater market 
share than the others does not necessarily mean that it is more 
culpable or necessarily caused more damage than the other members 
of the cartel. While courts may use market share to allocate financial 
responsibility in tort cases, price-fixing conspiracies are 
distinguishable because the firms with a smaller market share have 
enabled the firm with a larger market share to inflict injury. After all, 
if the smaller members of the cartel had not participated in the 
conspiracy, then the firm with a large market share would not have 
been able to successfully charge the cartel price. 
In essence, every member of a price-fixing conspiracy is 
responsible for all of the damages. In many criminal conspiracies, a 
reluctant participant can generally be replaced by someone else with 
similar skills—for example, the safe cracker in a bank-robbing 
conspiracy. In contrast, the market determines which firms are 
necessary participants for a price-fixing conspiracy to succeed and 
[i]f any competitor insists on price competition, either the conspiracy 
will fail or the uncooperative competitor will dramatically increase 
 
 166. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1290; see also id. at 1302 (discussing the “degree of 
culpability” among price-fixing conspirators). 
 167. If there is any firm that is “more culpable,” it is the ringleader. But the ringleader is not 
necessarily the firm with the greatest market share. Also, it can be difficult to determine who 
the ringleader is. Leslie, supra note 149, at 480. 
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its market share, to the benefit of the public paying lower prices and 
to the substantial detriment of the co-conspirators. The conspiracy is 
not likely to survive long under such circumstances.168 
Depending on the market structure and concentration, each 
conspirator can be a but-for cause of all cartel injuries.169 
Fairness arguments made in support of JSAs are also 
unpersuasive given their source. Although fairness arguments are 
most credible when made by innocents, those claiming the need for 
JSAs (or contribution) are generally wrongdoers in their own right.170 
When members of a price-fixing conspiracy attempt to share risk 
through a JSA, it is important to remember that the signatories are 
not merely intentional tortfeasors, they are often criminals.171 For 
example, the party seeking contribution has often already pled guilty 
or nolo contendere to criminal price-fixing charges.172 The unfairness 
 
 168. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 69 (Minority Report on 
Contribution); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 7 (statement of 
A. Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (discussing the need for cooperation from each 
member of a price-fixing conspiracy); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 21 (“For a 
cartel to be stable and effective, it must control enough of the production capacity of an industry 
so that when its members raise prices and correspondingly reduce output, outsiders cannot take 
up the slack.”); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1296 (“[T]he success of a conspiracy depends on the 
participation of all members. In this ‘one for all and all for one’ atmosphere, it is difficult to 
assess individual liability based on degree of participation or benefits derived. In effect, 
responsibility is indivisible, and the concept of contribution is somewhat artificial.”); 
Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 982 (“A policy holding all participants responsible for the effects of 
a concerted scheme is particularly appropriate in the antitrust area since, by economic necessity, 
the success of an anticompetitive scheme often depends on the participation of each. In a real 
sense, each defendant has caused the entire amount of damages.” (footnote omitted)). 
As Justice White noted in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 
134 (1968), “neither defendant, if he acted alone, could be charged with the violation; some 
degree of participation by both is essential to create a combination within the reach of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act,” id. at 144 (White, J., concurring). 
 169. S. REP NO. 96-428, at 29 (1979) (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. 
Kennedy); Corbett, supra note 164, at 116 (citing City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & 
Pipeworks, 127 F. 23, 25–26 (6th Cir. 1903)). 
 170. Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at 339 (“The first thing to be noted about the fairness 
issue is that the party claiming to have been unfairly treated is himself an intentional 
wrongdoer.”); see also Floyd, supra note 51, at 213 (“[C]ontribution is inappropriate in the case 
of intentional wrongdoers . . . .”). 
 171. This Article does not address unintentional violations, which are theoretically possible 
and have unique arguments in support of contribution. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. 
Tex. Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 906–08 (5th Cir. 1979) (Morgan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing in favor of awarding contribution to unintentional antitrust 
violaters), aff’d sub nom. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
 172. See, e.g., Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 633 n.4; USX Corp. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 738 N.E.2d 
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examples paraded out by procontribution commentators generally 
involve actual cartels, not false positives.173 These parties were in total 
control of their risk of being subjected to an “unfair whipsaw.” The 
easiest way to minimize the risk of being saddled with joint and 
several liability for treble the harm inflicted by a cartel is to not 
participate in a cartel in the first place.174 Thus, it is difficult to feel 
sorry for Olson Farms—the lone defendant in a price-fixing case 
infamous for that reason—because “[a]lthough Olson Farms allegedly 
purchased only eleven percent of the eggs sold by the plaintiffs, 
without its cooperation the conspiracy might have broken up with no 
injury to the plaintiffs. In that sense, Olson Farms was responsible for 
the plaintiffs’ entire loss.”175 While fairness arguments would be 
persuasive if advanced by innocent defendants,176 the anecdotal 
evidence suggests that innocent firms do not enter into JSAs.177 With a 
JSA, an innocent firm would be obligated to pay a percentage of the 
cartel overcharge, even if it did not participate in the cartel. True 
innocents can best protect themselves in court.178 In contrast, for truly 
culpable defendants—who lobby for statutory contribution and 
 
13, 19 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“The evidence presented to the trial court showed that B & LE 
pleaded no contest to a criminal indictment for violating the Sherman Act by engaging in the 
iron ore conspiracy . . . .”). 
 173. For example, after being the only party sued in an antitrust conspiracy, Olson Farms 
turned around and sued its co-conspirators, “alleging that they were participants in the unlawful 
conspiracy and thus liable to Olson Farms for contribution in respect to the judgment arising 
out of the original action.” Dickinson, supra note 20, at 151. If Olson Farms wanted to avoid the 
joint and several liability conundrum, it could have easily obeyed the law. 
 174. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at 364 (“[T]he prospective antitrust violator can 
avoid the harshness of the no-contribution rule simply by complying with the antitrust laws.”). 
 175. Note, supra note 15, at 903–04 n.73. 
 176. Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 6 (testimony of John 
Shenefield, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, Department of Justice) (“When one 
considers this possibility from the standpoint of an innocent defendant, who could not afford to 
risk putting its innocence to the test, there is indeed an unfairness which contribution rules such 
as this one might ameliorate.”); S. REP NO. 96-428, at 19 (1979) (“[I]t is necessary to balance the 
desire to terminate antitrust cases in as rapid a manner as possible with the rights of the 
defendants to utilize the courts to assert their innocence.”). 
 177. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 72 (statement of 
Robert P. Taylor, Attorney) (“Because Utah-Idaho believed itself to be totally innocent of 
wrongdoing, the company was extremely reluctant to enter into a judgment sharing agreement 
based upon sales.”). 
 178. See id. at 51 (testimony of Lowell E. Sachnoff, Attorney); see also, e.g., id. at 68 
(statement of Donald G. Kempf Jr.) (discussing the need for defendants to be able to litigate 
their individual antitrust cases on the merits). 
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negotiate JSAs whenever possible—cries of unfairness ring hollow 
given the well-understood penalties for price fixing.179 
Furthermore, any asymmetry in settlement amounts among 
price-fixing defendants raises fewer fairness concerns when one 
considers defendants’ positions ex ante. Those critics who lament the 
higher payouts by later-settling defendants focus exclusively on the 
outcomes ex post.180 This ignores the fact that all defendants generally 
have the same opportunity to approach plaintiffs with evidence and 
make a deal. Remaining silent in the hope that no member of the 
cartel will break ranks and having accepted the risk that its co-
conspirators will settle first, the holdout defendant is not in a position 
to cry foul when its gamble does not pay off. At the time that a price-
fixing suit is filed, there is ex ante equity among the suspected 
conspirators. Any defendant who does not want to be left holding the 
bag should provide evidence against its co-conspirators and settle. It 
cannot make credible fairness arguments based solely on ex post 
inequity.181 As Professor Lawrence Sullivan explained to Congress 
during the 1980s debate over antitrust contribution: 
Any defendant that suffers a big verdict are [sic] not a hopeless 
victim. First, it made a decision to participate in an unlawful 
conspiracy, and did so in order to make monopoly profits at the 
expense of consumers. Next, it made a strategic decision not to settle 
on terms on which others did settle. There is no obvious reason why 
such a firm should be regarded as victims [sic] of unfairness.182 
Even after the cartel is operating, each participating firm 
possesses the power to prevent itself from being “unfairly” saddled 
with the bulk of the liability—it can confess its participation in the 
 
 179. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 91 (statement of Harold E. 
Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) (“[T]he ancient maxim is: ‘Equity is not 
concerned about contributions among persons who are engaged in an illegal activity.’”). 
 180. See, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 51, at 221 (discussing In Re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979)); Laura J. 
Lodawer, Note, Contribution in Antitrust Actions: Is Fairness Reason Enough?, 14 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 575, 586 (1983) (same). 
 181. But see Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1540, 1543–44 
(1980) (“[E]x ante equity cannot eliminate ex post inequity, for the ex post unfairness of a no-
contribution rule remains regardless of the state of affairs ex ante.”). 
 182. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 509 (letter from Lawrence A. 
Sullivan, Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, University of Chicago, The Law School, to Peter 
W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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cartel to the DOJ’s Antitrust Division in exchange for amnesty, which 
would immunize the firm from all criminal liability and limit any 
damages in private litigation to single damages.183 Any defendant that 
finds itself at the end of the whipsaw has only itself to blame for not 
confessing to federal antitrust authorities in a timely manner. In short, 
the fact that a firm pays a higher settlement because it chose to join a 
price-fixing conspiracy and then failed to seek amnesty (or reach a 
settlement with plaintiffs) in a timely manner represents bad 
decisionmaking by the firm, not unfairness foisted upon it by an 
unjust system. 
While many condemn the absence of contribution as facilitating 
antitrust plaintiffs’ efforts to squeeze disproportionately large 
settlements out of innocent defendants,184 this concern appears more 
fanciful than factual. First, rational antitrust plaintiffs would not 
pursue a strategy of granting sweetheart deals to culpable defendants 
in the hopes of coercing a large settlement out of an innocent party. 
An innocent defendant is more likely to win at trial, in which case the 
antitrust plaintiff receives nothing except the early cheap settlements. 
As the American Bar Association Minority Report on Contribution 
noted, “No plaintiff wants to try his case against the most innocent or 
poorest defendant. . . . Plaintiffs prefer to try their cases against the 
very bad, very rich defendants.”185 Second, defendants who believe 
that they can prove their innocence are more likely to resist paying a 
high settlement than defendants who know their liability will be 
established at trial. Thus, innocents are less susceptible to pressure 
than the guilty.186 Rational plaintiffs would rather take advantage of 
 
 183. See Status Report, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Status Report: An Overview of 
Recent Developments in the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program 7–10 (2004), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/202531.pdf (discussing the basics of the 
Antitrust Division’s amnesty program). 
 184. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 66 (Minority Report on 
Contribution); Floyd, supra note 51, at 206 (“The more serious concern is that the settlement 
strategy employed by plaintiffs’ counsel has operated in practice to permit larger and more 
culpable defendants to settle early, leaving smaller and innocent ones facing liability for an 
entire industry in a nationwide class action suit as a result.”); supra notes 67–69 and 
accompanying text; see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim 
Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 STAN. L. REV. 447, 449 
(1981) (“[T]he no contribution rule achieves deterrence by imposing greater risks on innocent 
parties.”). 
 185. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 66 (Minority Report on 
Contribution). 
 186. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 461 (“Defendants who are confident that 
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the most vulnerable target when seeking the big payoff from the last 
settlements.187 Finally, no empirical evidence suggests antitrust 
plaintiffs normally enter into sweetheart deals in order to pursue 
innocent targets.188 
Although many commentators bemoan the risk of antitrust 
plaintiffs using whipsaw tactics to harass smaller defendants in price-
fixing conspiracy cases,189 the story traditionally spun is facially 
implausible. It would be irrational for an antitrust plaintiff to give 
deep-pocket defendants the break because smaller defendants are 
more likely to avoid payment by declaring bankruptcy.190 While 
evidence indicates that plaintiffs do in fact consider defendants’ 
financial situation when negotiating and accepting settlement offers,191 
 
they have committed no violations . . . will tend to be relatively optimistic . . . .”). 
 187. Floyd, supra note 51, at 192. 
 188. See S. REP NO. 96-428, at 37 (1979) (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. 
Kennedy) (“We have been presented with absolutely no evidence that the larger, more 
‘culpable’ defendants routinely settle price-fixing suits early in the litigation.”); A.B.A. 
ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 66 (Minority Report on Contribution) (“Whether 
such a dilemma has been so frequent and serious a phenomenon as to require legislative 
solution has not been proved. Certainly such a settlement approach does not comport with 
traditional litigation strategy.”); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 
8 (statement of A. Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (“Speaking from experience, I can 
tell you that plaintiffs do not prefer to try their cases against the most innocent or the poorest 
defendants.”); Floyd, supra note 51, at 206 (“It seems unlikely that plaintiffs’ counsel would 
deliberately pursue a strategy of settling with larger, more culpable, and more financially 
responsible defendants at bargain rates in order that they might preserve their claims against 
innocent defendants who would be unable to discharge a jury verdict against them in any 
event.”). 
 189. See supra notes 70−72 and accompanying text. 
 190. S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 38 (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. Kennedy) 
(“Plaintiffs have no interest in forcing a small company to bear the burden of lengthy and 
extraordinarily expensive litigation and the risk of bankruptcy.”); id. at 37 (“Professor Rose 
points out that ‘it is not known whether plaintiffs settle early with the larger defendants with any 
frequency. Moreover, it seems unlikely that plaintiffs would select large, more culpable 
defendants for easy treatment and consciously shift the burden of the judgment to smaller 
firms.’” (quoting Jonathan Rose, Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor Coll. of Law, Ariz. State 
Univ., Address at the ABA Antitrust Section Meeting (Aug. 13, 1979))); Easterbrook et al., 
supra note 95, at 343 (“At all events, there is no apparent reason why antitrust plaintiffs could 
generally seek to obtain disproportionately large recoveries from the smaller or less responsible 
defendants. If a plaintiff settles for a small amount with the larger defendants and proceeds to 
trial against the smaller defendants, he increases his risk that any judgment will be 
unsatisfied.”). 
 191. Riemer, supra note 7, at 307 (“There is much evidence that plaintiffs do consider the 
financial condition of particular defendants in evaluating possible settlement terms.”); see also, 
e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 619, 632 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (mentioning the 
plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant’s financial situation was a factor that affected the 
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this calculus favors smaller firms. Plaintiffs are generally willing to 
accept less money from smaller defendants.192 This makes sense 
because large firms are more capable of paying a large settlement or a 
significant jury award.193 Also, a savvy antitrust plaintiff will avoid 
taking only smaller firms to trial because they are better able to play 
on the jury’s sympathy.194 Finally, again, there is no evidence of 
plaintiffs using whipsaw tactics to force smaller firms to acquiesce to 
disproportionate settlement demands.195 
For the same reasons that rational plaintiffs will not grant 
sweetheart deals to large players with deep pockets in order to create 
leverage against smaller or less culpable defendants, plaintiffs are 
unlikely to pursue a strategy that risks bankrupting their quarry. No 
rational plaintiff has an incentive to drive any defendant into 
bankruptcy or to otherwise render it judgment-proof; nor would it 
want the last settling firm to have even a credible threat of declaring 
bankruptcy. The threat of bankruptcy emboldens the targeted 
 
settlement amount). 
 192. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 93 (statement of Harold E. 
Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) (“We have been settling cases with small 
businessmen who happen to be caught up in a conspiracy involving larger businessmen. We 
invariably settle for a much lesser figure with the small businessman.”); Riemer, supra note 7, at 
294 n.33 (“Indeed, there is much evidence supporting the conclusion that plaintiffs consider a 
defendant’s ability to pay in negotiating settlements and are likely to be satisfied with 
proportionately smaller recoveries from smaller defendants.”). 
 193. See Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 984 (“Since a strong market power is often crucial to 
the plaintiff’s case, it seems unlikely that a plaintiff would, without some qualms, allow a 
powerful defendant to buy its peace cheaply.”); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 455–56 
(“[A] firm with large assets might expect to pay a disproportionately large share of joint 
damages since it might predict that the plaintiff will choose to collect a disproportionate share of 
joint damages from it.”). 
 194. Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at 343. 
 195. See S. REP NO. 96-428, at 37 (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. 
Kennedy) (“Neither have we seen any evidence demonstrating that small defendants are 
ultimately forced to settle against their will for unreasonable amounts because of earlier 
settlements by larger defendants.”); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 14 (“The 
Subcommittee has also been given few, if any, examples in which small defendants were forced 
to shoulder grossly disproportionate liability for nationwide conspiracies.” (quoting STAFF OF 
THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., supra note 160)); Easterbrook et al., supra 
note 95, at 364 (“Nor is there persuasive evidence that some identifiable class of antitrust 
violators, such as small firms, are systematically at a disadvantage under the no-contribution 
rule compared to a contribution rule.”); see also Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, 
supra note 25, at 60 (testimony of Lowell E. Sachnoff, Attorney) (discussing the willingness of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to settle for smaller amounts with smaller defendants). 
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defendant and gives it leverage to pay less to an antitrust plaintiff.196 
Indeed, the risk of bankruptcy means that the plaintiff and defendant 
share a strong incentive to settle the litigation on mutually 
acceptable—and reasonable—terms. In antitrust class action 
litigation—in which proposed settlements must be approved by the 
court197—the risk that posttrial damages may bankrupt the defendant 
is a factor that courts consider in determining whether a settlement 
offer to the class is reasonable.198 Not surprisingly, there is no 
empirical evidence of antitrust plaintiffs pursuing whipsaw settlement 
strategies that could bankrupt the remaining defendants.199 In short, 
JSAs are not necessary to prevent antitrust litigation from driving 
firms into bankruptcy. 
In sum, the fairness arguments in support of contribution—
whether by statute, judicial fiat, or contract—are facially attractive, 
but wither under close scrutiny. The factual predicates of the fairness 
arguments—that small or innocent defendants are forced to pay 
disproportionately high settlements under threat of bankruptcy—are 
false. Furthermore, procontribution commentary generally fails to 
recognize that price-fixing defendants have constructed their dilemma 
through their own misdeeds. Finally, whatever their strength, the 
fairness arguments must be considered in light of other 
 
 196. See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 7, at 307 n.133 (discussing a memorandum filed by the 
plaintiffs in In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1979), in which 
“plaintiffs expressed willingness to settle with defendant H&H Poultry for less than the 
[amount] being demanded of other defendants because H&H was ‘hovering on the brink of 
bankruptcy’” (quoting the memorandum)); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, 
supra note 25, at 95 (statement of Harold E. Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) 
(“There is not one recorded or unrecorded instance where any small businessman was put out 
of business by any price-fixing case or any settlement in a price-fixing case.”); S. REP NO. 96-
428, at 37 (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. Kennedy) (“We have been 
presented with absolutely no evidence that the larger, more ‘culpable’ defendants routinely 
settle price-fixing suits early in the litigation. Neither have we seen any evidence demonstrating 
that small defendants are ultimately forced to settle against their will for unreasonable amounts 
because of earlier settlements by larger defendants.”). 
 197. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 198. See, e.g., In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 199. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 14 (“After hearing extensive 
testimony on the issue, a House Subcommittee Staff Report concluded: ‘The Subcommittee is 
aware of no case in which a small, relatively less culpable defendant has actually paid an 
outlandish judgment resulting in bankruptcy.’” (quoting STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., supra note 160)). 
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considerations, such as deterrence of price-fixing conspiracies, as the 
next Section explores. 
B.  Judgment-Sharing Agreements Undermine Deterrence of Price 
Fixing 
Any examination of JSAs must weigh the fairness arguments 
against the likely effects of these agreements on deterrence. The 
Supreme Court has often recognized that a “principal purpose of the 
anti-trust private cause of action is, of course, to deter anticompetitive 
practices.”200 No change in antitrust policy should take place without 
considering deterrence of antitrust violations, particularly price fixing. 
Deterrence is a function of three factors: the size of penalties, 
probability of liability, and risk aversion. First, raising the penalties 
associated with a violation of the law generally increases deterrence. 
Second, increasing the likelihood that offenders will be caught and 
held liable raises the expected costs of wrongdoing and thus increases 
the probability that firms will conclude that the offense is not cost-
beneficial. Third, a firm’s level of risk aversion will affect what 
combination of penalties and probability of liability the firm is willing 
to accept. If a firm is risk averse, it “looks not only at the expected 
value of the risk, but also its absolute magnitude, and it avoids 
strategies that subject it to the potential of a greater absolute loss 
even if it is less likely to suffer that loss.”201 
If the availability of JSAs affects any of these factors, these 
agreements could shape the level of antitrust deterrence. Judgment-
sharing agreements may affect all three variables. First, it may seem 
that JSAs should not change the penalty part of the deterrence 
calculation. In theory, JSAs should not influence the amount of 
damages in the event of liability because in a private case alleging 
horizontal price-fixing, the damages are treble the aggregate illegal 
overcharges charged by all of the cartel members, which should be a 
set number regardless of how the conspirators attempt to allocate 
liability through a JSA. While the above reasoning is true, it neglects 
the fact that the vast majority of price-fixing cases settle202 and the 
 
 200. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572 (1982) (citation 
omitted); accord Pfizer v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 
746 (1977). 
 201. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 27–28. 
 202. See Cavanagh, supra note 91, at 813 (“The Georgetown data indicate that 88.2% of the 
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ultimate penalty is not a function of treble the overcharge, but rather 
what the parties negotiate. Because JSAs lead to smaller aggregate 
settlements,203 they effectively reduce the penalty for price-fixing. 
Second, even if JSAs do not affect the conspiracy’s total damages 
upon a finding of liability, such agreements do diminish the 
probability that price fixers will be held liable for their antitrust 
violations. Previous analyses of the antitrust contribution issue have 
focused exclusively on the probability of individual liability assuming 
that the cartel as a whole is caught and successfully held liable.204 This 
overlooks a more fundamental inquiry: how does the presence of a 
JSA affect the probability of the cartel as a whole evading liability? 
Economic analyses of the effect of contribution rules on deterrence 
have assumed that the probability of cartel detection (and subsequent 
liability) remains constant.205 But this is not the case. JSAs reduce the 
probability of liability for two reasons. First, JSAs reduce the 
probability that one of the alleged co-conspirators will settle early, 
fund the litigation, and increase the pressure on the remaining 
defendants to settle.206 Second, JSAs reduce the likelihood that 
inculpatory evidence will be collected.207 While contribution rights 
increase the probability of individual accountability if the cartel is 
exposed, JSAs increase the probability of the cartel escaping liability 
altogether. Consequently, JSAs can reduce deterrence of price-fixing 
activity. 
Third, JSAs may encourage price fixing among firms that are risk 
averse. Whether or not allowing contribution enhances or reduces 
 
antitrust cases surveyed settled.”). 
 203. See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text. 
 204. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 971–72 (discussing the availability of contribution 
as a factor in a business’s cost-benefit analysis before entering a price-fixing conspiracy). 
 205. See, e.g., Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at 353 (“Yet even if these conditions do not 
obtain, the choice between contribution and no contribution is not affected, at least as a first 
approximation, because that choice does not affect the total damages assessed for unlawful joint 
action but only the distribution of the damages (ex post, and sometimes ex ante) among those 
who participate in the joint action.”); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 450–52 (calculating 
the business incentives both with and without contribution rules but keeping the probability of 
detection constant). 
Congress, too, assumed no effect on the amount of money the plaintiff could recover. See 
S. REP NO. 96-428, at 2 (1979) (“S. 1468 would not, however, change the principle of joint and 
several liability and thus would not impair the plaintiff’s rights vis-à-vis any defendant.”). That is 
incorrect. See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra notes 39–54 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra notes 125–46 and accompanying text. 
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deterrence will largely be a function of price-fixing firms’ willingness 
to accept risk. If firms are risk neutral—and the total penalties and 
the probability of liability are held constant—contribution rules 
should theoretically not affect deterrence. Professors Polinsky and 
Shavell explain, “[U]nder no contribution, each defendant faces some 
probability of having to pay the entire judgment. Under contribution, 
all defendants share the entire judgment, so that each faces a higher 
probability of having to pay an amount proportionally less than the 
entire judgment.”208 A risk-neutral firm is indifferent between facing a 
10 percent probability of paying $80,000,000 and an 80 percent 
probability of paying $10,000,000.209 Each has an expected cost of 
$8,000,000. The risk-neutral firm is concerned only with the expected 
value of alternatives, not the absolute magnitude of any particular 
outcome.210 If the disastrous outcome has a sufficiently low 
probability, the risk-neutral firm will pursue a potentially perilous 
course so long as that option has a preferable expected value 
compared to the available alternatives. 
If firms are risk averse, then allowing contribution in antitrust 
cases would diminish deterrence. The risk-averse firm focuses not 
solely on the relative expected values of various options, but also on 
the absolute magnitude associated with each alternative.211 Thus, a 
risk-averse firm may decide to pay a $6,000,000 fine instead of 
accepting a 5 percent probability of paying a $100,000,000 fine. The 
latter has a lower expected cost—$5,000,000 versus $6,000,000—but 
the absolute amount of money at risk in the second scenario is 
staggering. The more risk averse a firm is, the more likely that it will 
be deterred by a no-contribution regime.212 For risk-averse firms, 
“economists agree that the deterrent effect of [the] no contribution 
rule exceeds the deterrent effect of contribution or claim reduction 
since it exposes the potential wrongdoer to a risk of greater absolute 
magnitude.”213 For firms whose desire to remain an ongoing business 
 
 208. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 450–51. 
 209. I have made the probability under the contribution regime 80 percent instead of 100 
percent to reflect the uncertainty that any member of the cartel will be held liable. 
 210. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 450 (“Risk neutral firms consider only the 
‘expected value’ of a risky situation—that is, the magnitude of the risk discounted by its 
probability.”). 
 211. Id. at 452. 
 212. See BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 45, at 34. 
 213. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 28; see also Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 
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is paramount, the threat of debilitating damages is a greater deterrent 
than a higher probability of lower damages.214 In rejecting a right to 
contribution among antitrust defendants, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, 
“that very possibility of imposition of sole liability has an enhanced 
deterrent effect. The chance that a participant may be faced with a 
full judgment is more likely to discourage anticompetitive conduct 
than would ensuring that each participant pays only some fair 
share.”215 
While there is no general consensus among economists,216 much 
theoretical217 and empirical evidence218 suggests that firms are, in fact, 
largely risk averse. Firms often behave in a risk-averse manner, such 
as by purchasing property and liability insurance.219 The risk aversion 
of antitrust defendants is also sometimes indicated by their strong 
 
1307 (“[I]f a firm is risk averse a contribution rule may provide less deterrence.”). 
Yet even before the development of modern economics and congressional enactment of 
the Sherman Act in 1890, courts had long recognized that a low likelihood of being held liable 
for all of the damages may be a better deterrent than allocating financial responsibility among 
all the wrongdoers. See Rhea v. White, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 90, 91 (1859) (“[T]here can be no 
contribution between wrongdoers. The reason of this is, that they may be intimidated from 
committing the wrong, by the danger of each being made responsible for all the 
consequences.”). 
 214. See Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 976 (“The desire that the business survive probably 
provides a restraint powerful enough to outweigh even an owner’s strong profit motive. Smaller 
businesses, even more than their larger counterparts, can ill afford the cost of antitrust 
violations, particularly under a no-contribution rule.”). 
 215. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1979), 
aff’d sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
 216. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1309 (“Whether firms are, in fact, risk averse has generated 
much scholarly debate but has produced no consensus.”); Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at 
352 n.50 (“We conclude that the extent and intensity of risk aversion among firms is an 
unsettled empirical question.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent 
Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55, 56–57 (1979) (presenting theoretical model of firms’ risk 
aversion). 
 218. E.g., KENNETH G. ELZINGA & WILLIAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A 
STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 128–29 (1976); Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 974 n.81 
(“Empirical data supports the existence of risk aversion among a significant population of the 
business community.”); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 450 
(letter from Lowell Sachnoff, Esq., Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd, to Peter W. Rodino, 
Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Top level corporate managers are intensely risk 
averse . . . .”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1267 
(1995) (arguing that, in the context of class action settlements, “[m]ost people are risk averse, 
preferring a certain resolution to an uncertain opportunity”). 
 219. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 452 n.18. 
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preference for settlement over litigation.220 Importantly, firms operate 
through managers, who are often conservative by nature and prone to 
pursue less risky paths, lest a large mistake cost them their careers.221 
Price-fixing firms, in particular, have demonstrated aversion to 
risk by entering into JSAs.222 Signatories to JSAs are risk averse by 
definition—they would rather pay a proportion of total damages than 
risk paying a greater percentage of the plaintiff’s total damages, even 
though the latter risk is low and includes the possibility of paying no 
damages at all.223 Also, firms in judgment-sharing arrangements want 
to avoid risk so much that they are willing to pay transaction costs to 
negotiate JSAs in order to avoid the high-cost, lower-risk event of 
being held liable for the bulk of the harm caused by the cartel. Price 
fixers incur these transaction costs in order to spread risk. All of this 
suggests that JSAs actually reduce cartel deterrence. For risk-averse 
firms, the prospects of significant damages awards can deter price-
fixing activity. But JSAs effectively cap a price-fixing firm’s exposure 
in antitrust litigation, which undermines deterrence.224 
In addition to reducing the maximum penalty, JSAs may also 
diminish deterrence by providing greater certainty to firms engaged 
in illegal price-fixing. Uncertainty can increase deterrence of 
conspiracies.225 Firms often share a general distaste for uncertainty. 
 
 220. See Cirace, supra note 55, at 49 n.20. 
 221. See Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1309 (“A respectable body of literature urges that 
corporate managers are risk averse.”); Dickinson, supra note 20, at 188 (“[P]revailing economic 
theory . . . labels modern managers as generally risk averse.”). 
 222. See CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES 314–15 (1973). 
While some commentators have suggested that firms breaking the law may actually have a 
preference for risk, A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 29 (“[W]hen considering the 
behavior of firms which are prone to violate the law, an assumption of risk preference might 
even be appropriate . . . .”), firms in illegal cartels are not necessarily risk seekers because price-
fixing may have a positive expected value even under bad conditions, such as when the cartel is 
exposed and its members are held liable, see, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage 
Levels Should Be Raised, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 329, 341 n.48 (2004) (“[R]esearch 
demonstrates that the international vitamin cartel generated the largest total of antitrust fines 
and penalties in history, which are calculated to be between $4.4 and $5.6 billion. But the 
cartel’s monopoly profits in all areas of the world were $9 to $13 billion.” (quoting Brief for 
Professors Darren Bush et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, Empagran, S.A. v. 
F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 533933)). 
 223. This statement assumes a constant probability of detection. To the extent that JSAs 
reduce the probability of detection, signatories to JSAs could arguably be risk neutral. 
 224. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 62 (statement of 
Lowell E. Sachnoff). 
 225. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 13 (testimony of Stephen D. 
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Indeed, one of the primary reasons that some firms enter price-fixing 
conspiracies is to reduce uncertainty. For example, in the infamous 
electrical equipment cartels of the 1950s and 1960s, “the 
attractiveness of a secure market arrangement represented a major 
ingredient drawing corporate officers to the price-fixing violations. 
The elimination of competition meant the avoidance of uncertainty, 
the formalization and predictability of outcome, the minimization of 
risks.”226 By significantly limiting the maximum damages that any one 
cartel member could be forced to pay, JSAs can result in risk-averse 
firms concluding that price-fixing is either cost-beneficial or at least 
an acceptable gamble.227 
If uncertainty is the Achilles’ heel of price-fixing firms, antitrust 
policy should retain that vulnerability. But JSAs provide a measure of 
certainty by eliminating the risk that a firm will be held liable for all 
of the damages associated with the cartel. By entering into JSAs, 
firms set the percentage of damages that they are comfortable 
accepting instead of competing against each other to make a better 
deal with the plaintiff. This weakens deterrence.228 With a JSA in 
place, firms can more accurately perform a cost-benefit analysis on 
the wisdom of joining a price-fixing conspiracy.229 In the absence of a 
contribution mechanism, firms considering joining a cartel may be 
unable to conduct cost-benefit analysis with sufficient confidence.230 
 
Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan); Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 
1307, 1342–43 (2003). 
 226. Geis, supra note 126, at 150. 
 227. Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 50 (statement of Lowell E. 
Sachnoff) (“With contribution, the same businessman who can sit down with his competitors 
and fix prices for a product can simply add another item on the agenda; that is, since we can get 
contribution, if we are caught, we can then lay off another cost of business, among our 
competitors, because we aren’t faced with the serious penalty of joint and several liability.”). 
 228. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1314 (“Deterrence may be weakened if price-fixers are 
permitted to allocate damages among themselves rather than face liability for all damages 
inflicted by a conspiracy.”). 
 229. Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 27–28 (statement by John 
Shenefield, United States Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, Department of Justice) (“By 
amending this system so that each conspirator is liable only for that portion of total damages 
attributable to his own conduct, potential price-fixers may be more able to predict in advance 
their maximum liability and may have reduced incentives to interfere with the successful 
functioning of the conspiracy, since a suit by a single plaintiff against any conspirator may well 
involve all conspirators in suits for contribution.”); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1297 (“In 
addition, because a contribution rule makes individual liability more certain, it is easier, at least 
in theory, to develop a cost-benefit analysis regarding a company’s illegal acts.”). 
 230. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 12 (statement of Stephen D. 
LESLIE IN FINAL FOR WESTLAW AND LEXIS.DOC 2/19/2009  11:23:57 AM 
2009] JUDGMENT-SHARING AGREEMENTS 801 
 
However, the JSA provides greater precision and predictability in the 
decision to join a cartel231 and, with the maximum punishment capped 
by the JSA, a firm may be more likely to conclude that price-fixing is 
worth the risk.232 
Some commentators assert that price-fixing firms do not perform 
cost-benefit analyses233 and, even if they did, criminal sanctions and 
treble damages would be sufficient to deter antitrust violations.234 
These arguments are unpersuasive. First, like all business decisions, 
executives weigh the costs and benefits of cartel participation—price 
fixing is never a crime of passion. Second, these sanctions are 
currently inadequate, as proven by the fact that major firms continue 
to fix prices and enter JSAs to spread the penalties. Third, these 
arguments assume that defendants actually pay treble damages, but 
even defendants found liable often pay less than single damages235 and 
most antitrust claims settle for pennies on the dollar.236 Thus, if 
 
Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan) (“In addition, the no-contribution rule helps prevent the 
type of cost-benefit analysis of potential price fixing that would so easily occur if each defendant 
knew in advance that it will have to pay a predictable share of the conspiracy damages.”). 
 231. Id. at 82 (testimony of Harold E. Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) 
(“[JSAs] can give precise dollar amounts; they can give precise product amounts; they can give 
precise percentages of sharing, which they did.”); S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 33 (1979) (supplemental 
views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. Kennedy) (discussing the predictability afforded by JSAs). 
 232. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 24 (“Opponents claim that if 
potential wrongdoers knew in advance the amount of their potential liability, which would 
ordinarily be much less than the potential liability of the conspiracy as a whole, the balance 
against the expected return of the crime would more often tip in favor of violating the law.”). 
Because contribution provides firms a way to reduce uncertainty, one early court rejected 
contribution in antitrust cases, “believ[ing] that the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws may be 
increased by not permitting defendants to redistribute the cost of an antitrust violation.” El 
Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., No. C-75-2492 AJZ, 1976 WL 1382, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 
1976). 
Although some contribution proponents have asserted that price-fixers do not engage in 
cost-benefit analysis, see, e.g., Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 233 
(letter from Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, to members of the H. 
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law), the weight of theoretical and empirical 
evidence suggests that price fixers do, see id. at 449 (letter from Lowell Sachnoff, Esq., Sachnoff 
Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd, to Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 233. See, e.g., id. at 233 (letter from Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, 
to members of the H. Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law). 
 234. See, e.g., id. at 145 (statement of Robert P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro); 
id. at 233 (letter from Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, to members of the 
H. Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law). 
 235. Lande, supra note 222, at 341 n.48. 
 236. See Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust 
Class Action Litigation, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1035–36 (2008). 
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defendants are only responsible for damages associated with their 
own sales and they pay less than single damages for their overcharges, 
price-fixing firms can profit from their misdeeds even if caught. In 
short, by eliminating joint and several liability, JSAs minimize the 
effect of treble damages. 
But perhaps the most persuasive evidence that JSAs reduce 
deterrence is the fact that price-fixing firms—not simply firms accused 
of price-fixing, but firms actually convicted in criminal proceedings—
have embraced such agreements so enthusiastically.237 Convicted 
price-fixing firms championed the contribution legislation debated 
(though ultimately rejected) in the 1980s.238 The previous national 
debates about contribution in antitrust litigation often failed to 
consider how price-fixing firms themselves viewed the ability to 
allocate antitrust liability based on market share, though some 
commentators observed that “the very distaste that antitrust violators 
show for the traditional no-contribution rule in itself demonstrates 
the deterrent value of that rule.”239 The proliferation of JSAs provides 
more concrete evidence that price-fixing firms prefer to manage the 
risks of their illegal conduct by preapportioning damages. This does 
not bode well for cartel deterrence: price-fixing firms would not enter 
into JSAs if such agreements reduced the expected profitability of 
cartel activity. Thus, when price-fixing firms and their counsel 
champion JSAs as increasing deterrence and facilitating 
settlements,240 one must consider the source and be suspicious that 
alleged, potential, and actual price-fixing firms tout the deterrent 
effect of contribution, but antitrust victims do not. Indeed, innocent 
firms shun JSAs.241 
 
 237. See, e.g., BANE, supra note 222, at 234, 314–15. 
 238. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 81 (testimony of Harold E. 
Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) (stating that the movement to create a 
statutory right to contribution in price-fixing cases “originated a few years ago with a very small 
group of companies in the forest products industry who were engaged in probably the most 
extensive series of price-fixing conspiracies this country has seen since the electrical conspiracies 
of 20 years ago in the early 1960’s”). 
 239. Id. at 17 (statement of Stephen D. Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan). 
 240. See id.; id. at 145 (statement of Robert P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro). 
 241. Id. at 7 (statement of A. Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (“Defendants who 
prefer settlement to long-term litigation generally avoid sharing agreements. They view 
litigation as an intolerable expense and risk. They believe themselves innocent, but they are 
willing to pay a price to get out of the case.”). 
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Unfortunately, to date, courts have not appreciated the 
detrimental effects that JSAs may have on deterring antitrust 
violations. Without much analysis, some courts have rejected the 
argument that JSAs undermine deterrence and have, consequently, 
declined to invalidate JSAs.242 For example, the Oklahoma district 
court in Cimarron asserted that because JSAs do not violate antitrust 
laws “the argument that such agreements should be prohibited due to 
the policy of deterrence in those laws should logically fail as well.”243 
In essence, the court assumed the legal conclusion—that JSAs are not 
themselves illegal—and then rejected any argument at odds with this 
predetermined conclusion. A better understanding of the potential 
anticompetitive effects of JSAs may induce greater judicial scrutiny of 
such contracts. 
C. Low Risk of Overdeterrence 
Although some worry that the staggering individual damages 
made possible by the lack of contribution in treble-damage antitrust 
actions could deter beneficial conduct,244 those arguments hold little 
water in the context of price-fixing cases. Overdeterrence concerns 
should inform discussions when the scope of antitrust law is 
imprecise.245 But they do not really apply when the illegal conduct is 
well defined and clearly without redeeming value, such as price-fixing 
conspiracies.246 As former Assistant Attorney General William Baxter 
 
 242. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Group, 851 F. Supp. 1361, 1365–66 
(D. Minn. 1994); Cimarron Pipeline Constr. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Nos. CIV-89-822-T, 
CIV-89-1886-T, 1992 WL 350612, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 1992) (“The deterrent effect of the 
severe penalties imposed upon a party convicted of committing antitrust violations cannot be 
deemed to be outweighed by the benefits of a sharing agreement as the Plaintiffs contend.”). 
 243. Cimarron Pipeline Constr., 1992 WL 350612, at *2. 
 244. See, e.g., Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 145 (statement of 
Robert P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro) (“[O]ne must consider the danger that 
exposure to massive liability may deter desirable, pro-competitive business behavior.”); Note, 
supra note 181, at 1545 (“Indeed, prohibition of contribution could overdeter corporations from 
performing acts bordering upon antitrust violations but beneficial to society.”); supra notes 
87−90 and accompanying text. 
 245. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 462–63. 
 246. Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 17 (testimony of John 
Shenefield, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, Department of Justice) (“In the price-
fixing area, however, I don’t have the same kind of concern. I think where you are dealing with 
a per se violation of the law and one that is easy to define, one that everybody agrees is harmful, 
that the question of overdeterrence is probably not so serious.”); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, 
supra note 6, at 25 (“[I]t is highly questionable whether unambiguously criminal conduct such as 
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noted “[b]ecause true cartel behavior can never yield any benefit, by 
definition it cannot be overdeterred.”247 
Importantly, firms concerned about forgoing efficient 
agreements out of fear of antitrust liability—magnified by the risk of 
joint and several liability without contribution—can protect their 
legitimate activities in a variety of ways. For example, they can create 
a legitimate joint venture, which could eliminate antitrust liability 
altogether.248 Alternatively, antitrust law already contains mechanisms 
to prevent deterrence of beneficial collaborations. For example, the 
National Cooperative Research and Production Act and the 
Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 
provide for single damages for members of properly registered joint 
ventures and Standard Setting Organizations that are found liable for 
violating the Sherman Act.249 Notably, none of these judicial or 
legislative initiatives existed during the last congressional 
contribution debate in the 1980s. These avenues would significantly 
reduce any antitrust exposure while simultaneously providing some 
 
hard core price fixing can ever be overdeterred.”); BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 45, at 35 (“If 
horizontal price fixing could be correctly defined, the problem of overdeterrence could not 
occur since horizontal price fixing has little if any social benefit.”); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 
1297 (“The argument that the present system overdeters is more theoretical than real. . . . [T]he 
primary target of the no-contribution rule is horizontal price-fixing, which has no socially useful 
benefits and hence cannot be overdeterred.”). 
The risks of overdeterring beneficial behavior seem greatest in Section Two cases and in 
Section One cases involving vertical restraints. In the context of Section Two of the Sherman 
Act—which condemns unilateral conduct characterized as monopolization or attempted 
monopolization—an efficient competitor could theoretically be deterred from competing 
aggressively but legitimately. While this risk is real, it is unaffected by the presence or absence 
of JSAs because there are rarely multiple defendants in Section Two cases. Because JSAs are 
not seen in Section Two litigation, condemning them is unlikely to chill the zeal of an aggressive 
competitor. In contrast, Section One cases involving restraints generally involve multiple 
defendants. Vertical restraints are more likely to increase efficiency than horizontal restraints 
and thus antitrust should be more concerned about deterring efficient vertical agreements. But 
JSAs appear not in vertical restraint cases, but rather in horizontal price-fixing cases. See, e.g., 
In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 247. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 466 (letter from William F. 
Baxter, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Peter W. Rodino, 
Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); see also id. at 9 (testimony of Stephen D. Susman, 
Esq., Susman & McGowan) (“Everyone admits, however, that there is nothing socially useful 
about price fixing, and therefore you could not only triple damages, quadruple, tenfold, 
twentyfold damages, and there would be no danger whatsoever of deterring socially useful 
conduct.”). 
 248. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006). 
 249. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–05 (2006). 
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assurance that the firms’ activities were not unreasonably 
anticompetitive. Most notably, these protective measures require the 
firms to make their relationship public, as opposed to JSAs, which are 
often confidential and do not alert antitrust authorities or affected 
private parties about any suspect cooperation among competitors.250 
D. Balancing Deterrence and Unfairness 
To the extent that the whipsaw creates some unfairness while 
nevertheless enhancing deterrence of price-fixing, the need for 
deterrence outweighs the desire to facilitate fairness among 
conspirators. Automatic trebling of damages might not be particularly 
fair but when Congress originally made the trade-off between 
deterrence and fairness, the former prevailed. Congress opted for 
treble damages because—while harsh—it would increase 
deterrence.251 Congress focused on the need to protect consumers 
from price fixers, not the need to protect price fixers from their co-
conspirators.252 In rejecting a right to contribution in antitrust 
litigation, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he very idea of treble 
damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future, 
unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers.”253 In 
short, deterrence of price-fixing is more important than fairness 
among price fixers. 
Fairness is not irrelevant, but at the margin when trading off 
between fairness and deterrence, deterrence trumps. Some judges 
have upheld JSAs because they “can ‘ameliorat[e] [the] harsh result’ 
that joint and several liability can pose.”254 But courts are not 
 
 250. See infra notes 256–58 and accompanying text. 
 251. Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 978 (“Had Congress been concerned with ensuring that 
defendants not pay more than the damages they actually caused, it would have limited the 
liability to that amount. Instead, it enacted a provision whose most salient features are 
deterrent: the provision magnifies the defendant’s penalty and, by overcompensating plaintiffs, 
induces them to bring suit.”). 
 252. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (“Moreover, it is 
equally clear that the Sherman Act and the provision for treble-damages actions under the 
Clayton Act were not adopted for the benefit of the participants in a conspiracy to restrain 
trade.”). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Phillip A. Proger & Deborah Platt Herman, The Price of Price Fixing Through 
International Cartels, 1999 BUS. L. INT’L 24, 48 (quoting In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs 
Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) 
(mem.)). 
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supposed to ameliorate the harsh results of congressional policies to 
deter violations and compensate victims. 
V. HOW ANTITRUST LAW SHOULD ADDRESS  
JUDGMENT-SHARING AGREEMENTS 
Despite the potential for price-fixing firms to employ a JSA as a 
cartel-stabilizing device, antitrust law does not recognize the 
anticompetitive consequences of such agreements. Those few courts 
to consider JSAs have upheld them as legitimate risk-spreading 
mechanisms.255 Unfortunately, much of the legitimacy of JSAs stems 
from the fact that too little is known about them. Price-fixing 
defendants negotiate them in private and their terms are generally 
kept confidential. This Part advocates greater transparency and 
discoverability of JSAs so that judges and scholars can study and 
better understand their effects. Based on future empirical work, 
courts should revisit their approval of JSAs. If courts were to 
denounce JSAs because they stabilize cartels, judicial condemnation 
can either be weak (by rendering JSAs unenforceable) or strong (by 
treating JSAs as illegal restraints of trade under Section One of the 
Sherman Act). This Part considers both options and concludes that 
either approach would currently be premature given our incomplete 
knowledge of the net effects of actual JSAs. Instead of arguing that 
JSAs represent an antitrust violation in and of themselves, this 
Article advocates a role for JSAs in proving the existence of an 
underlying illegal price-fixing conspiracy. 
A.  A Call for Greater Transparency 
The primary problem with advocating any significant change in 
the law regarding JSAs is the lack of any meaningful empirical data 
on their terms and effects. Before courts condemn a species of 
contract that has existed for decades, they need a better 
understanding of when these agreements are negotiated, what their 
terms are, who enters into such agreements, and whether JSAs tend 
to act as cartel-stabilizing devices. A better understanding of these 
issues will help judges, scholars, and attorneys assess the 
anticompetitive potential in any given JSA. The actual terms of JSAs 
 
 255. Riemer, supra note 7, at 316 (“Current antitrust doctrine establishes that sharing 
agreements do not violate the Sherman Act.”). 
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will determine their anticompetitive potential,256 but no systematic 
research has been done on the subject. 
Two important aspects of JSAs that need exploration are when 
they are entered into and who enters into them. First, the timing of 
when JSAs are negotiated and signed is significant and warrants 
study. Co-conspirators could enter into JSAs either before or after 
the threat or onset of litigation. Some commentators assume that 
firms enter JSAs only after an antitrust violation is detected.257 But 
most JSAs exist in secrecy and little is known about their terms or 
timing. At least some JSAs have been in place years before litigation 
began.258 And the timing of the agreement may be important in 
evaluating its anticompetitive impact. Price-fixing firms may enter 
into a JSA before the onset of antitrust litigation because it provides 
assurance to risk-averse firms considering whether to join a cartel. 
Because the pressure to settle will exist once a price-fixing suit is 
filed, some executives may only feel comfortable participating in the 
conspiracy if the JSA is in place at the outset.259 After an antitrust 
lawsuit is filed, price-fixing defendants are often unable to reach a 
judgment-sharing accord given their divergent individual incentives at 
that point.260 Judgment-sharing agreements can be difficult and time-
 
 256. See infra notes 300–02 and accompanying text. 
 257. See, e.g., Mary B. Cranston & John S. Kingdon, Judgment Sharing Agreements, 1985 
Research Project of the Civil Practice and Procedure Committee, ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L. 8 
(1985) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“A sharing agreement does not necessarily lessen 
any deterrent value to the treble damages remedy since it is negotiated and executed after any 
alleged wrongdoing and the filing of a lawsuit.”); Riemer, supra note 7, at 314 (“Common-law 
principles of contracts also suggest that, because sharing agreements are entered into only after 
the occurrence of a violation, such agreements cannot contravene the policy of deterrence.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
The assumption is reasonable given that most publicly known JSAs were apparently 
negotiated after litigation was filed. See, e.g., Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra 
note 25, at 71 (statement of Robert P. Taylor) (discussing the Western Asphalt litigation). 
 258. Discovery in some products liability litigation has revealed judgment-sharing 
agreements that have been in place for over two decades before being disclosed during 
litigation. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Production of Joint Defense Agreement at 1, In re Welding Fume Rod Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 
1:03-CV-17000, 2005 WL 5408315 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 2005), 2005 WL 3671330. 
 259. See Reimer, supra note 7, at 313 (“A risk-averse firm, weighing the value and risks of 
violating the antitrust laws, likely has no assurance that the other potential co-conspirators will 
agree to enter into a sharing agreement if, after the violation, they are sued by the injured 
parties.”). 
 260. See, e.g., id. at 313 n.175. 
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consuming to negotiate.261 A firm worried that one of its cartel 
partners may defect and provide evidence to an antitrust plaintiff 
would rather negotiate and sign this agreement in advance before a 
lawsuit is filed and the cartel partners have greater incentive to 
defect. 
Second, judges and scholars need to understand who enters into 
JSAs. Firms that have not engaged in illegal price fixing should be 
able to enter into private agreements to spread litigation risk. But this 
raises the issue of which firms actually take advantage of JSAs. Most 
judgment-sharing agreements are confidential,262 which makes 
generalizing about the signatories to these agreements difficult. Of 
those judgment-sharing agreements that have been exposed, 
however, many involve firms that have, in fact, engaged in illegal 
price fixing.263 If these cases are typical, this reality holds great 
significance for antitrust jurisprudence. For example, if JSAs are used 
primarily—or perhaps even exclusively—by firms that actually 
belonged to price-fixing cartels, that can help build a case for 
condemning such agreements and expanding the range of reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from their existence. 
How can scholars and policymakers learn more about these and 
other aspects of JSAs? Two primary avenues exist to make JSAs 
more transparent. First, federal antitrust authorities could take the 
lead. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could 
require firms to register their judgment-sharing agreements. If the 
plaintiff could prove that the defendants had entered into a judgment-
sharing agreement but had not properly registered it with the federal 
government, this could create a rebuttable presumption that the 
judgment-sharing agreement operated as a cartel-stabilizing device. 
Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act grants the FTC the 
authority to use its subpoena powers to pursue investigations.264 Using 
its powers, the FTC could subpoena and review JSAs, publishing the 
results of its study.265 FTC review of otherwise confidential 
 
 261. Civil Remedies Issues: Hearings Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission 14–15 
(2005) (statement of Harry M. Reasoner, Esq., Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.), http://govinfo.library. 
unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Reasoner.pdf. 
 262. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 263. See, e.g., BANE, supra note 222, at 234. 
 264. 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2006). 
 265. Id. § 46(f). 
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settlements is not unprecedented: due to the risk of anticompetitive 
collusion, settlements between patent applicants in an interference 
proceeding must be registered with the FTC, or else the resulting 
patent will be rendered unenforceable. 
Second, JSAs should be discoverable in private antitrust 
litigation against alleged price fixers. Although courts sometimes 
order production of JSAs,266 plaintiffs are generally unaware of the 
presence of JSAs and, even when they know a JSA exists, plaintiffs 
are often kept ignorant of the JSA’s terms.267 Courts often hold that 
JSAs are not discoverable.268 Judges have reasoned that “[j]udgment 
sharing agreements are, in effect, a form of settlement, and drafts of 
settlements and settlement negotiations among counsel are generally 
not discoverable.”269 
JSAs should be discoverable for several reasons. First, the 
existence and terms of JSAs are relevant to the issue of witness bias.270 
It is common for defendants to settle and testify against their former 
cartel partners, and for codefendants at trial to blame each other. If 
the defendants in a price-fixing trial are not blaming each other, the 
jury may wonder why. If kept unaware of a JSA, the jurors may infer 
that there was no cartel. The jury—or judge in a bench trial—should 
know about the terms of any JSA because those terms can alter the 
defendants’ incentives regarding testimony and trial strategy. Second, 
JSAs should be discoverable because they may provide significant 
evidence about which firms were participants in—or may have 
relevant information about—the alleged price-fixing conspiracy. The 
content and circumstances behind the JSA may expose 
 
 266. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., Nos. 98 Civ. 861 RWS, 99 Civ. 
3607 RWS, 2003 WL 1345136, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2003); Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. 
Barr Labs., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 861 RWS, 2003 WL 135653, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2003) (mem.); 
In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 991317 MDL, 2002 WL 31761289, at *1 
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2002). 
 267. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 150 (testimony of Harold 
E. Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) (“In many cases, the plaintiffs don’t even 
know the terms of [the JSA].”); Cranston & Kingdon, supra note 257, at 2 (“The challenges that 
have thus far been made by plaintiffs’ counsel have been either attempts to discover the 
contents of the agreement, or to void the agreement altogether as contrary to public policy. So 
far, neither challenge has proved successful in court.”). 
 268. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 35, at 61 (noting that “courts have refused to 
order production of [judgment-sharing] agreements in discovery” (citations omitted)). 
 269. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 1995 WL 221853, at *4. 
 270. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 2003 WL 135653, at *2. 
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knowledgeable individuals who should be deposed. Third, knowing 
the terms of the JSA could help the plaintiff reach partial 
settlements.271 
Signatories to JSAs generally argue that the details of their 
agreements are privileged.272 However, it is unlikely that a pre-existing 
JSA is properly covered by any privilege. First, attorney-client 
privilege should not apply because the agreements are not 
communications between attorneys and clients in search of legal 
advice.273 Furthermore, the privilege does not protect communications 
made in furtherance of a future crime or fraud.274 To the extent that a 
JSA is part and parcel of a price-fixing conspiracy, the document falls 
outside the protection of the attorney-client privilege. Second, JSAs 
are not protected under work-product doctrine, which is narrowly 
interpreted to apply to an attorney’s impressions, observations and 
opinions.275 Also, the crime-fraud exception applies here as well.276 
Most importantly, JSAs are agreements among alleged conspirators. 
At a minimum, courts should know the contents of JSAs. If JSAs are 
privileged, then cartels could embed price-fixing agreements within 
JSAs and conceal their illegal contracts from view.277 Indeed, if 
privilege extended to agreements between competitors, price-fixing 
agreements themselves could arguably be privileged, an absurd result 
that no court should countenance. 
Understanding how cartels operate and how JSAs can serve to 
simultaneously stabilize and conceal price-fixing activity should 
 
 271. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.23 (“Sharing agreements 
should be discoverable. Once the agreement is made known, it may be possible to structure 
partial settlements to take its terms into account.”). 
 272. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 2003 WL 135653, at *2. 
 273. See United States v. Skeddle, 989 F. Supp. 890, 900 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (noting that the 
attorney-client privilege only protects communications necessary for providing legal advice). 
 274. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989). 
 275. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (“If the court orders discovery . . . it must protect against 
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s 
attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.”). 
 276. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562–63. 
 277. Cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.23 (“In presenting 
settlement agreements for judicial approval, however, the parties are obliged to make full 
disclosure of all terms and understandings, including any side agreements. The settling parties 
may request that certain terms not be disclosed to other parties, but must justify this to the 
court.”). 
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inform how courts approach legal challenges to both the substance 
and secrecy of such agreements among alleged co-conspirators. 
B.  Judgment-Sharing Agreements as Unenforceable Contracts 
The simplest response to concerns about JSAs would be to 
render such agreements unenforceable. While businesses can enter 
private contracts and have the terms enforced in court, the right to 
contract is not absolute. Both state law and federal antitrust law limit 
the ability of firms to enter into several types of contracts. Although 
no state or federal statute prohibits judgment-sharing agreements, the 
common law of contracts can still render them unenforceable. A 
contract is unenforceable on public policy grounds if “legislation 
provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is 
clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy.”278 Most 
importantly, the law does not generally allow participants in illegal 
conspiracies to fashion their own remedy among themselves. 
The argument for unenforceability is straightforward. 
Agreements that create inappropriate incentives—for example, 
incentives to suppress of relevant evidence of illegal conduct—should 
be void as against public policy. Federal courts would never enforce a 
price-fixing agreement should a cartel member bring a breach of 
contract suit against another firm that cheated on the cartel. Because 
JSAs can create incentives for price-fixing firms to continue to 
conceal their misdeeds and can stabilize an illegal conspiracy, courts 
should also refuse to become de facto cartel-enforcement 
mechanisms.279 Furthermore, if the JSA is entered into before the 
actual price-fixing occurs, the contract may be void as an attempt to 
indemnify participants for illegal activity before it occurs.280 To the 
extent that a JSA operates as a form of insurance against antitrust 
liability, courts could void the agreement as against public policy.281 
 
 278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981). 
 279. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 10 (testimony of Stephen D. 
Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan) (arguing that judicial enforcement of a JSA “would be 
against public policy, because it would encourage and facilitate a crime”). 
 280. Cf. Riemer, supra note 7, at 314 (“Although courts uniformly hold that contracts 
indemnifying a party for a subsequent illegal act are void, courts have long upheld contracts to 
indemnify a party for an illegal act that has already been committed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 281. See St. Paul Ins. Cos. v. Talladega Nursing Home, Inc., 606 F.2d 631, 633–34 (5th Cir. 
1979). But see Cranston & Kingdon, supra note 257, at 9–10 (“First, a sharing agreement does 
not provide for complete indemnification or exemption from responsibility. All parties do bear 
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Although JSAs could be held unenforceable under either federal 
antitrust law or state common law principles, blanket unenforceability 
would be both overinclusive and underinclusive. On the one hand, 
this approach could be overinclusive because it would condemn 
legitimate risk-spreading accords by innocent defendants who have 
done nothing wrong. On the other hand, mere unenforceability may 
not go far enough in cases in which the signatories did in fact fix 
prices. Agreements need not be legally enforceable in order to 
stabilize a cartel. If such contracts were simply unenforceable, the 
parties could still legally negotiate and memorialize their agreement. 
Even if not enforceable in court, JSAs could form the basis of a 
cartel-stabilizing gentlemen’s agreement. Most aspects of agreements 
among price-fixing firms are not enforceable in court. For example, in 
order to conceal their conspiracy, price-fixing firms agree to forbid 
cartel participants from taking notes. Although no court would 
recognize legal liability stemming from breach of one of these 
agreements, the mere presence of these kinds of agreements has 
served to stabilize many a cartel in the past.282 If judgment-sharing 
agreements were merely unenforceable, cartel members could 
develop alternative enforcement mechanisms. This is essentially how 
cartel members deal with the unenforceability of price-fixing 
agreements themselves. The mere fact that competitors were able to 
come to an unenforceable agreement on damage allocation could 
cause co-conspirators to decline to trade a low settlement in exchange 
for providing evidence against the former cartel partners, even if it 
does not appear in any firm’s individual self-interest to abide by the 
agreement. Historically, cartel members often honor agreements that 
are against their short-term interests in order to preserve harmonious 
relations with their cartel partners.283 
Because mere unenforceability may be insufficient to rid JSAs of 
their cartel-stabilizing effects (while at the same time invalidating 
legitimate attempts to spread litigation risk), perhaps antitrust law 
should condemn those JSAs among firms that have either the purpose 
or effect of stabilizing a cartel. This more targeted approach might 
 
a relative share of responsibility for the alleged wrongdoing and are not insured against all 
liability.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 282. The agreements are not perfect, as some individuals may violate the agreement, but 
they have a stabilizing influence. 
 283. Leslie, supra note 148, at 568. 
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avoid the problems of under- and overinclusiveness that would result 
from simply holding all JSAs to be unenforceable. 
C.  Judgment-Sharing Agreements as Unreasonable Restraints of 
Trade 
Section One of the Sherman Act condemns agreements that 
unreasonably restrain trade.284 Courts commonly hold that “the 
elements of a section 1 violation are threefold: 1) joint or concerted 
action between more than one party that 2) unreasonably restrains 
trade in 3) interstate or foreign commerce.”285 In determining which 
agreements unreasonably restrain trade, courts generally condemn 
agreements that stabilize price-fixing conspiracies. For example, 
because members of a cartel may cheat by offering discounts on 
transportation or extending credit to consumers, many cartels require 
the use of base-point pricing286 and prohibit cartel members from 
extending credit. Recognizing that these side agreements may 
strengthen an underlying cartel, antitrust law proscribes such 
accords.287 If JSAs have similar cartel-stabilizing effects, courts could 
also hold them violative of antitrust laws. 
Antitrust law primarily uses two modes of analysis to determine 
whether a challenged restraint of trade is unreasonable: the per se 
rule and rule-of-reason analysis. Under the per se rule, certain 
categories of agreements are deemed unreasonable as a matter of law. 
Those trade restraints that do not fall within a per se category are 
evaluated under the rule of reason, in which the factfinder determines 
whether the particular challenged agreement has a net 
anticompetitive effect. 
 
 284. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 285. R.D. Imports Ryno Indus. v. Mazda Distribs., 807 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 286. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 714 (1948); see also Leslie, supra note 148, at 577–78 
(explaining the cartel-stabilizing effects of base-point pricing). Base-point pricing is a practice in 
which transportation costs (which are ultimately factored into the price the consumer pays) are 
calculated as though all items are shipped from a single location). Aaron S. Edlin, Do 
Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, and Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 528, 554 n.7 (1997). This prevents firms from cheating on a price-fixing 
agreement by cutting transportation costs. 
 287. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (holding that 
agreements to eliminate short-term trade credit are anti-competitive); Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 
721 (upholding the Federal Trade Commission’s conclusion that the base-point pricing system is 
an unfair trade practice). 
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1. Per Se Rule.  JSAs are unlikely candidates for per se illegality. 
The Supreme Court has frequently “expressed reluctance to adopt 
per se rules . . . ‘where the economic impact of certain practices is not 
immediately obvious.’”288 Thus, courts reserve per se condemnation 
for agreements “that would always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output.”289 In applying this standard, federal 
judges rely on collective judicial exposure and understanding, 
declining to classify a particular category of agreement as per se 
illegal until courts have garnered “considerable experience” and can 
confidently rely on empirical data.290 Although Part III argues that 
JSAs may help price-fixing conspirators stabilize and conceal their 
cartel, no body of empirical literature or judicial opinions contends 
that JSAs necessarily or inherently decrease output or restrict 
competition in a way that inflicts antitrust injury. The absence of 
relevant judicial experience counsels against per se treatment.291 
Furthermore, courts decline to condemn trade restraints as 
categorically unreasonable unless the practice lacks “any redeeming 
virtue.”292 To the extent that JSAs operate as risk-spreading devices 
that even defendants that have not violated antitrust laws would 
value, JSAs serve a function unrelated to the suppression of 
competition, and thus should fall outside of antitrust’s per se rule. 
Finally, given the current widespread support of judgment-sharing 
 
 288. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276, 1279 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)). 
 289. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289–90 
(1985) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Colum. Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)). 
 290. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972) (citation omitted); see 
also Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 9 (quoting Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 607–08); 
Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (“Once experience with a particular kind 
of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, 
it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.”); State Oil Co. v. 
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (quoting Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 344); Atl. Richfield Co. v. 
USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990) (same); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (same). 
 291. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 10 (“[E]xperience hardly counsels that we 
should outlaw the blanket license as a per se restraint of trade.”); Appalachian Coals v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 344, 377 (1933) (“Nothing in theory or experience indicates that the selection of 
a common selling agency to represent a number of producers should be deemed to be more 
abnormal than the formation of a huge corporation bringing various independent units into one 
ownership.”); cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) (“[W]e have decided that it 
would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this case. This decision is not based on a lack of 
judicial experience with this type of arrangement . . . .”). 
 292. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
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agreements, it would simply be too jarring to declare such contracts 
per se illegal. It would undermine the legitimacy of antitrust law in a 
manner similar to that of the effect of the Supreme Court’s 
declaration in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.293 that nonprice 
vertical restraints are per se illegal,294 despite the absence of empirical 
evidence of consistent anticompetitive effects.295 
2. Rule of Reason.  Because JSAs can serve valid business 
purposes unrelated to the suppression of competition—risk spreading 
and mellowing the harshness of joint and several liability without 
contribution—antitrust law should not condemn them as illegal per 
se. But neither should it give them a free pass in all instances. 
Because JSAs among alleged cartelists carry the inherent risk of 
stabilizing or concealing a cartel, they should not be per se legal. With 
neither form of per se treatment appropriate, suspect JSAs are perfect 
candidates for rule-of-reason analysis. 
Under a rule-of-reason analysis, courts would determine whether 
a particular JSA is, on balance, anticompetitive. The traditional rule-
of-reason factors for evaluating any challenged agreement include its 
purpose, history, and competitive effects.296 But these factors may 
prove insufficient when analyzing JSAs because these contracts take 
place in the shadow of litigation over allegations of the most serious 
antitrust violation. If the defendants are found liable on the price-
fixing charges, liability for the additional agreement to sign a JSA 
would seem to add little to the defendants’ legal woes or the 
plaintiffs’ coffers. 
Nevertheless, if during litigation the JSA itself can be invalidated 
under rule-of-reason analysis, that could prompt cartel members to 
provide evidence of price fixing in exchange for a lower settlement. 
But, of course, not all JSAs are necessarily entered into by defendants 
who have actually conspired to fix prices. This raises the fundamental 
question: Is there a way to distinguish between acceptable JSAs and 
anticompetitive ones? The rule-of-reason factors for evaluating JSA 
should include, at a minimum, the issues for further study discussed in 
 
 293. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
 294. Id. at 377–78. 
 295. See Donald E. Knebel, Antitrust Counseling: The Five Factors of Antitrust Liability, 9 J. 
CORP. L. 359, 362 (1984) (noting the lack of evidence in Arnold, Schwinn & Co.). 
 296. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
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Section A. These include: when the JSA was entered into (before or 
after the onset of litigation); whether the JSA’s terms prevent 
competition among co-conspirators to compete for the best deal with 
the plaintiff; and whether the JSA makes individual settlements 
practically or contractually unlikely or impossible. Additional 
considerations might include whether there is any evidence of intent 
to conceal underlying illegal activity and whether the JSA was secret 
or publicly acknowledged. 
 a. Timing of the Judgment-Sharing Agreement.  The timing of the 
JSA is a relevant factor. If the alleged price fixers entered into a JSA 
before any litigation process began or was imminent, this may suggest 
that the JSA was part of a cartel agreement. Risk-averse members of 
price-fixing cartels may prefer to have a JSA in place at the outset. 
This would essentially place a cap on exposure to antitrust damages, 
which would allow the firm to conclude that price-fixing was on 
balance likely to be cost beneficial. JSAs entered into before the filing 
of antitrust litigation may also be more likely to deter a price-fixing 
firm from seeking amnesty with the DOJ Antitrust Division.297 
Furthermore, entering a JSA before the commencement of litigation 
magnifies the agreement’s evidence-concealing effects because there 
is no window between the filing of the price-fixing suit and the signing 
of the JSA during which one conspirator could sell out the cartel by 
trading evidence for a low settlement. By diminishing the probability 
of settlement while creating incentives to conceal evidence, 
prelitigation JSAs are particularly dangerous to competition. 
In contrast, if the JSA was entered into after a price-fixing case 
had been filed or initiated, then it may be less damning. A firm with 
valuable evidence against other cartel members would be less likely 
to sign a JSA after the plaintiff files a price-fixing suit because at that 
moment it can eliminate its exposure at little or no cost by exchanging 
its evidence for repose. In contrast, signing the JSA at that point 
almost ensures that it will have to pay the plaintiff a greater sum of 
 
 297. See supra notes 149–56 and accompanying text. 
In theory, a firm cannot get amnesty if the government has already initiated an 
investigation into suspected price-fixing. However, if the government has not developed 
sufficient evidence to prosecute and the first confessing firm provides such evidence, then that 
firm can get amnesty or a particularly attractive deal. See Leslie, supra note 130, at 1659–60 
(discussing Christie’s deal in the auction house price-fixing case). 
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money.298 This does not suggest a rule of per se legality for 
postlitigation JSAs because a JSA can be anticompetitive even if it is 
entered into after the filing of a price-fixing lawsuit.299 But this timing 
is less inherently suspicious and therefore in the rule-of-reason 
analysis would weigh less strongly toward condemning the JSA. 
 b. Terms of the Judgment-Sharing Agreement.  The individual 
terms of a judgment-sharing agreement may also render the 
agreement an unreasonable restraint of trade. Two areas of concern 
stand out. First, JSA terms may unreasonably hinder signatories from 
individually settling with the plaintiffs. For example, some JSAs 
preclude a co-conspirator from entering into any settlement that does 
not require the plaintiff to agree to particular terms (for example, 
foregoing joint and several liability). In more extreme cases, JSAs 
have “forbade any individual settlement by a signatory and stated 
that any settlement offer on behalf of all the participants to the 
sharing agreement must be determined by a majority vote of those 
participants.”300 The refusal to settle individually smacks of price-
fixing or a group boycott.301 The defendants should be competing 
against each other for the best deal from the buyer, in this case the 
antitrust plaintiff. 
Second, JSA terms could discourage signatories from providing 
evidence of price fixing. Cartel members sometimes operate as a unit, 
apparently agreeing to jointly assert Fifth Amendment rights and 
block plaintiffs’ access to necessary evidence.302 Any term that 
punished cartel exposure or cooperation with plaintiffs’ counsel or 
antitrust authorities would clearly demonstrate the anticompetitive 
nature of the judgment-sharing agreement. For example, if the 
agreement provided a greater share of damages for the first signatory 
 
 298. The firm would not have to pay the plaintiff anything if the suit is dismissed or the 
defendants prevail at summary judgment, the probability of which increases if the members of 
the cartel successfully conceal the incriminating evidence of price fixing. 
 299. A per se legal rule is also inappropriate because the parties may have already 
negotiated the JSA but have waited to sign and date it until litigation is imminent, at which 
point all parties execute the previously concealed JSA. 
 300. Cimarron Pipeline Constr. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Nos. CIV-89-822-T, CIV-89-
1886-T, 1992 WL 350612, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 1992) (discussing In re San Juan Dupont 
Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 129 F.R.D. 424 (D.P.R. 1989)). 
 301. See Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 361 F.2d 451, 459 (3d Cir. 1966). 
 302. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 28 (testimony of Stephen 
D. Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan). 
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to settle or for any signatory that supplied incriminating evidence 
against the other signatories, such terms would suggest that the 
agreement was intended as a cartel-stabilizing and cartel-concealing 
device and not as a legitimate effort to spread risk among innocent 
defendants. 
In sum, if particular terms significantly reduce the incentive for 
price-fixing defendants to settle or to provide evidence to plaintiffs, 
that should count against the signatories in a rule-of-reason analysis. 
Given the lack of study, however, it may be too soon to condemn 
JSAs because we have an insufficient understanding of their 
anticompetitive effects. But this is not a reason to give a complete 
pass to JSAs; it is the reason that further study is warranted. 
 c. Secrecy.  The creation of a JSA prior to the onset of price-fixing 
litigation might suggest the JSA is used to stabilize a cartel. If so, this 
creates a significant incentive for the signatories of such prelitigation 
JSAs to keep them secret. If the reforms suggested in Section A were 
adopted and signatories still concealed their JSA, that could indicate 
an anticompetitive purpose of stabilizing a secret price-fixing 
conspiracy. Firms do not generally announce the existence and 
substance of their private contracts, nor should they be expected to. 
However, because JSAs have the potential for stabilizing price-fixing 
conspiracies, they should not be treated as ordinary business contracts 
that are inherently confidential. Failing to disclose a JSA when 
required to do so by the FTC or in discovery should be considered as 
part of the rule-of-reason analysis. 
D.  Judgment-Sharing Agreements as a Plus Factor 
Even if it would be premature to conclude that JSAs may 
constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, JSAs could play a role 
in price-fixing cases with respect to the first element of a Section One 
claim—the presence of an agreement among firms. Because price 
fixing is per se illegal, in most price-fixing litigation the imperative 
question is whether or not the defendants actually agreed to fix 
prices. In a minority of cases, clear evidence of a conspiracy exists in 
the form of written notes memorializing agreements among 
competitors or of audio or video recordings of price-fixing 
discussions. But antitrust plaintiffs rarely have such a smoking gun. 
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Price-fixing plaintiffs generally must prove the existence of an 
agreement through circumstantial evidence.303 
Courts refer to the legal test for showing a price-fixing agreement 
through circumstantial evidence as “conscious parallelism with plus 
factors.”304 Conscious parallelism is the process “not in itself unlawful, 
by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share 
monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, 
supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic 
interests.”305 Parallel conduct alone is insufficient to establish an 
agreement.306 In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate the presence 
of so-called plus factors that suggest the conscious parallelism was the 
product of an agreement, not independent action.307 Common plus 
factors include whether the parallel conduct represents a radical 
change in policy,308 as well as “actions contrary to a defendant’s 
economic self-interest, product uniformity, exchange of price 
information and opportunity to meet, and a common motive to 
conspire or a large number of communications.”309 
To date, courts and commentators have shunned the idea that 
JSAs could constitute a plus factor. Courts do not permit plaintiffs to 
refer to the JSA as circumstantial evidence of an underlying price-
 
 303. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 226 (7th Cir. 1978) 
(“Most price fixing conspiracies are established through circumstantial evidence.”). 
 304. See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] horizontal price-
fixing agreement may be inferred on the basis of conscious parallelism, when such 
interdependent conduct is accompanied by circumstantial evidence and plus factors.”); 
Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Ga. Theatre, Co., 672 F.2d 485, 501 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The rule of 
‘conscious parallelism and plus factors’ has governed proof of much conspiratorial conduct up 
through the present.” (citation omitted)). 
 305. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). 
 306. Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 307. See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., Inc., 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 
2000) (“An agreement is properly inferred from conscious parallelism only when certain ‘plus 
factors’ exist.” (citations omitted)); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“In the absence of direct evidence, the plaintiffs may nevertheless support their claim 
with circumstantial evidence of conscious parallelism.”); Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 
1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[P]arallel pricing, without more, does not itself establish a 
violation . . . . Courts require additional evidence which they have described as ‘plus factors.’”). 
 308. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222 (1939) (“Compliance with 
the [film distributors’] proposals involved a radical departure from the previous business 
practices of the industry and a drastic increase in admission prices of most of the subsequent-run 
theatres.”). 
 309. Wallace, 55 F.3d at 1168 (citations omitted). 
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fixing conspiracy.310 Jurors generally are prevented from even 
knowing that the defendants entered into a JSA.311 The Manual for 
Complex Litigation takes the position that if the jury is told about the 
JSA—for example, because it is relevant to witness bias—the court 
should issue “a limiting instruction that the agreement is not to be 
considered proof or disproof of liability or damages.”312 But neither 
judges nor the authors of the Manual actually analyze the relationship 
between JSAs and price-fixing conspiracies. 
There are sound arguments for why the presence of a JSA 
between price-fixing defendants could be treated as a relevant plus 
factor. Part III explained how JSAs can stabilize a cartel. The mere 
fact that competitors are cooperating by entering into an agreement 
that increases utility for the group but eliminates the ability of each 
individual firm to escape liability at reduced cost suggests the 
presence of a group dynamic conducive to cartelization. And if 
further study shows that actual price-fixing firms enter into JSAs 
more often than innocent firms, then the existence of a JSA may have 
even greater probative value. 
Again, timing is important. If a JSA were entered into before 
antitrust litigation was filed or threatened, this could be indicative of 
underlying illegal agreements. Absent litigation or a preexisting price-
fixing conspiracy, the members of an industry would seem to have 
little cause to meet and negotiate an agreement to allocate damages 
in a future price-fixing case. A truly innocent firm would have to 
worry that the other members of the industry were engaging in illegal 
behavior and setting up the innocent firm to pay a share of any 
eventual damages. In contrast, it would be perfectly logical for the 
members of an ongoing price-fixing conspiracy to agree—before the 
filing of a price-fixing lawsuit—to allocate any future antitrust 
 
 310. The congressional debate about contribution yielded this exchange: 
Mr. SEIBERLING. Doesn’t the very existence of a sharing agreement tend to 
reinforce charges of conspiracy or cartel? 
Mr. KOHN. No, the evidence is not permitted. No lawyer would waste time trying to 
put it in. No judge would permit it. 
Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 150 (testimony of Harold E. Kohn, 
Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.). 
 311. Id. at 151 (“I assure you, I have been practicing for 40 years. I have been trying 
antitrust cases for 25 years. I have never yet seen the situation where there was the slightest 
suggestion with respect to a sharing agreement that ever got before the jury . . . .”). 
 312. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.23 (footnote omitted). 
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damages because this facilitates the cartel’s risk management. It 
remains possible that once price-fixing litigation is actually filed, risk-
averse defendants may seek to reduce their maximum exposure by 
entering into a JSA with their codefendants. More empirical work 
needs to be done to answer this question satisfactorily. How often do 
truly innocent firms enter into JSAs? If very rarely, then the presence 
of the JSA is, in fact, probative. Given the importance of timing 
issues, depending on what further research shows, perhaps the 
presence of a JSA should only be a plus factor when it is entered into 
before the onset of price-fixing litigation. 
If the presence of a JSA were treated as a plus factor for 
inferring a conspiracy among the signatories, this would raise the 
issue of whether juries might assign too much weight to the fact that 
price-fixing defendants have entered into a JSA. Juries could 
theoretically construe the existence of the JSA as prima facie proof of 
a price-fixing conspiracy. But defendants will have the opportunity to 
explain why they entered the JSA despite their innocence, and courts 
could address the issue of overweighting with a limiting instruction. 
To the extent that JSAs operate as a form of risk-spreading 
insurance, the evidentiary rule in tort cases that precludes juries from 
learning that a defendant has insurance may be analogous and might 
suggest that a jury should not learn of a JSA’s existence.313 The 
situations, however, are not equivalent. Courts exclude evidence of 
insurance because it is both irrelevant and potentially prejudicial 
because juries may infer negligence from the fact that the defendant 
possesses insurance.314 Insurance coverage is irrelevant because “it 
simply has no bearing on the fault of a defendant.”315 As the Advisory 
Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence declare, “the 
inference of fault from the fact of insurance coverage is a tenuous 
one, as is its converse.”316 
Although the rule generally barring admission of insurance 
evidence is sound, JSAs are distinguishable. Unlike evidence of 
insurance coverage, the presence of a JSA may, in fact, be probative 
 
 313. See FED. R. EVID. 411 (“Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability 
is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise 
wrongfully.”). 
 314. See Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197, 208 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 315. Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 316. FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee’s note. 
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of liability, depending on the JSA’s terms, timing, and context. Courts 
describe the evidentiary rules regarding insurance as generally 
excluding the “existence of a collateral source of revenue to pay a 
judgment.”317 But JSAs are not a mere alternative payment source; 
rather, JSAs represent a mutual financial commitment among alleged 
price fixers to pay each other in the event of liability for illegal 
conspiracies. The defendant has obligated itself to pay a portion of its 
alleged co-conspirators’ damages. This is markedly different than 
traditional insurance policies in which the insured pays a third party 
for coverage but does not indemnify its competitors in any way. As 
explained in Part III, defendants may enter JSAs to conceal and 
stabilize an underlying price-fixing conspiracy. Thus, unlike 
conventional liability insurance, the presence of the JSA may be 
probative of the underlying liability, not merely of the ability to pay 
or relative distribution of damage award.318 
Treating a JSA as merely one plus factor would not necessarily 
condemn the signatories as antitrust violators. Courts generally 
require a multitude of plus factors before allowing juries to infer a 
price-fixing agreement.319 If a defendant’s signature on a JSA were 
considered a plus factor, this would lighten the antitrust plaintiff’s 
load but not carry it completely. Importantly, antitrust law has 
plentiful safeguards to protect innocent defendants. The Supreme 
Court has increased the height and number of hurdles that plaintiffs’ 
 
 317. Williams, 689 F.2d at 1391. 
 318. Courts also fear that evidence of insurance coverage “would result in extravagant 
verdicts” because juries believe that the defendant will not have to pay out of its own pocket. 
Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1965). This is a particular concern in tort 
litigation in which the jury can award punitive damages. The risk of a runaway jury awarding 
excessive damages is less in antitrust cases because an antitrust jury only calculates 
compensatory damages, which the judge trebles. An antitrust jury is generally not asked to 
“send a message” to defendants. 
Further, JSAs are distinguishable from insurance coverage on this front, as well. Courts 
may worry that juries will award a sympathetic plaintiff more money if the jurors believe the 
defendant will not be personally responsible because an insurance company will pay. But a JSA 
does not allow a liable price-fixing defendant to completely shift financial responsibility to an 
absent, deep-pocketed third party. The defendant remains responsible for the JSA-stipulated 
percentage of total antitrust damages paid by all of the signatories to the JSA, including 
settlement payments and jury awards. In short, informing the jury about the JSA should not 
lead to an inappropriate increase in damages awarded by juries in price-fixing cases. 
 319. See In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Parallel pricing is a 
relevant factor to be considered along with the evidence as a whole; if there are sufficient other 
‘plus’ factors, an inference of conspiracy can be reasonable.”). 
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counsel must clear in order to survive dismissal and summary 
judgment.320 Indeed, it is arguably too difficult for antitrust plaintiffs 
to pursue and succeed on legitimate claims;321 the likelihood of 
frivolous or nonmeritorious claims prevailing is not great. The 
presence of a JSA alone would probably be insufficient for a plaintiff 
to survive a motion to dismiss, let alone a motion for summary 
judgment, when the plaintiff is proving the agreement using conscious 
parallelism with plus factors. 
In short, the presence of a judgment-sharing agreement among 
the members of an industry prior to the onset of litigation may be 
circumstantial evidence of an underlying price-fixing conspiracy. 
E.  Noerr-Pennington Issues 
Signatories to a JSA may argue that their agreement is immune 
from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which 
protects the ability of firms to jointly pursue litigation.322 Courts have 
expanded Noerr-Pennington immunity to cover tasks ancillary to 
litigation.323 But that does not mean that any contracts that 
competitors make with an eye toward eventual litigation are 
necessarily protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity. Noerr-
Pennington immunity protects petitioning activity directed toward 
government actors. JSAs do not fit within this mold; they are 
generally secret agreements among competitors that the parties 
intend to conceal from the government. Furthermore, settlement 
 
 320. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965–66 (2007) (holding that a valid 
claim under Section One of the Sherman Act based on allegations of parallel conduct requires 
“enough factual matter” that “raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel 
conduct”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–88 (1986) 
(holding that, to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must show evidence that 
likely excludes “competing inferences of independent action or collusive action”). 
 321. See Christopher R. Leslie, Rational Irrationality 41–42 (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that, “if the plaintiff’s theory of the case conflicts with the 
judge’s own view of how businesses operate, the latter will prevail even if the plaintiff provides 
strong evidence to support its allegations”). 
 322. Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972). 
 323. See, e.g., Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 
2000); McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc., 958 F.2d 1552, 1560 (11th Cir. 1992); Colum. Pictures 
Indus., Inc. v. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (9th Cir. 1991); Coastal 
States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1367 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[I]t would be absurd to hold 
that [petitioning immunity] does not protect those acts reasonably and normally attendant upon 
effective litigation.”). 
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agreements are not necessarily protected by Noerr-Pennington in that 
settlement agreements can themselves violate the Sherman Act.324 Of 
course, JSAs are not settlement agreements themselves; rather they 
are contracts among alleged price fixers that make settlement more 
difficult. These agreements should be given no more protection than 
settlement agreements themselves. In any case, treating JSAs agreed 
to before the filing of antitrust litigation as a plus factor does not 
implicate Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
Judgment-sharing agreements provide a way for codefendants in 
price-fixing cases to manage risk. Businesses should generally be able 
to organize their affairs in a manner that reduces their exposure to 
legal liability, but that principle has limits. In particular, while 
legitimate businesses should be able to minimize uncertainty when 
possible, antitrust law should not allow cartels to effectively manage 
risk so as to prolong their unlawful existence. JSAs may help cartelists 
conceal their illegal agreements and may lead firms to conclude that 
price-fixing is cost-beneficial. Judges and scholars should take these 
considerations into account when discussing whether price-fixing 
defendants should have an unfettered ability to enter into enforceable 
judgment-sharing agreements. 
Given the ubiquity of JSAs and their potential to facilitate illegal 
conspiracies, more study is necessary. Unfortunately, meaningful 
empirical research is impossible so long as JSAs largely remain 
shielded from public view. If judges order more disclosure of JSAs 
that come before them, scholars will be better able to understand how 
the timing, frequency, and terms of JSAs may affect the potential 
anticompetitive risks associated with those agreements. Also, greater 
transparency will permit researchers to determine whether signatories 
to JSAs are, in fact, more likely to be firms that have actually fixed 
prices or firms that have been falsely accused. If research confirms 
 
 324. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 169 (1930) (stating, in holding 
that a settlement agreement did not violate antitrust laws, that “[a]ny agreement between 
competitors may be illegal if part of a large plan to control interstate markets”); In re 
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Plaintiffs can 
establish a Sherman Act violation by alleging facts from which it can be inferred that 
[defendants] entered into the Settlement Agreement in bad faith and used the agreement to 
restrain or monopolize trade.”). 
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that JSA signatories are primarily price-fixing—not innocent—firms, 
that would be strong evidence that such agreements are 
anticompetitive. 
While additional research will be helpful, antitrust courts need 
not await the results of further investigation before scrutinizing JSAs 
more closely. Given that JSAs may conceal and stabilize price-fixing 
conspiracies—and given the propensity of actual price-fixing firms to 
enter JSAs—antitrust law should not treat these agreements as per se 
legal. This Article does not argue that JSAs inevitably have 
anticompetitive effects, so neither is per se illegality appropriate. 
Rather, courts should analyze JSAs under the rule of reason. In 
particular, antitrust law should condemn those JSAs that penalize a 
signatory for settling early or providing evidence to an antitrust 
plaintiff. In addition to an antitrust analysis of the reasonableness of a 
particular sharing agreement, this Article argues that the presence of 
JSAs may also serve as a plus factor for proving an underlying price-
fixing agreement, which would be per se illegal. Consequently, JSAs 
may be relevant to both the agreement and the unreasonable restraint 
elements of a Section One claim. At a minimum, more research is 
warranted to determine how JSAs are negotiated and implemented, 
to analyze the consequences of past JSAs, and to predict the effects of 
current and future JSAs. 
